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1343 
RICO EXTRATERRITORIALITY, RJR NABISCO AND 
SHAREHOLDER RESIDENCE – A KEY CONSIDERATION IN 
DETERMINING RICO DOMESTIC INJURY 
Laurence A. Steckman, Esq.* 
Adam J. Rader, Esq.** 
In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,1 the Supreme 
Court held that a private plaintiff alleging claims under the Racketeer 
 
* Laurence Steckman is a principal attorney with Offit Kurman, PA and has been 
litigating securities and complex commercial cases for more than thirty years.  In 
July 2006, Super Lawyers Magazine identified Mr. Steckman as one of New York's 
first “Super Lawyers” in securities and business litigation, an honor he has received 
six times since then.  He has authored or been principal co-author of more than fifty 
published works on the law, and  book chapters, and a co-authored volume on exis-
tential psychology.  He is an entrepreneur involved in the infrastructure and energy 
sectors.  Mr. Steckman pursued doctoral studies in philosophy at Columbia Univer-
sity prior to attending law school after he received his undergraduate degree summa 
cum laude  in classic guitar.  He graduated Touro Law School in 1988, with honors, 
and began his law career in the litigation department of Shea & Gould in New York 
City. 
** Adam J. Rader is a principal attorney with the law firm Offit Kurman, PA and has 
been litigating and arbitrating complex commercial domestic and international busi-
ness cases in state courts, federal courts, and arbitral fora for more than twenty-five 
years.  He handles criminal and civil cases, including matters ranging from interna-
tional trade and extradition to trademark and Native American law.  He has handled 
high profile matters ranging from representation of a prominent German real estate 
developer in extradition proceedings to representing an Azerbaijani law professor 
accused of attempting to sell artwork allegedly stolen during World War II.  He re-
cently defended a high-profile Russian oligarch fighting extradition to the U.S. to 
respond to allegations of Foreign Corrupt Practices and RICO violations in connec-
tion with India investments.  Mr. Rader is a graduate of University of Wisconsin-
Madison Law School. 
1 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty.,136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).  In RJR, the Euro-
pean Community and twenty-six of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (“RJR”) 
alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering en-
terprise in violation of the RICO statute.  The European Community claimed Colom-
bian and Russian criminal organizations imported illegal drugs into European coun-
tries, where they produced revenue in euros which was laundered back into the 
1
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),2 must overcome 
a presumption against extraterritorial application of that statute,3 by 
alleging a “domestic injury” to plaintiff’s business or property.4  Be-
cause plaintiff withdrew its claims for domestic injury,5 the Court pro-
vided little guidance as to how courts should determine when a “do-
mestic injury” is incurred.6  The issue is important in cases involving 
complex, international frauds which, as the world effectively shrinks, 
are posing increasingly significant risks to international investors and 
markets.7 
Some courts have held that the location of a business entity 
plaintiffs should be the sole factor in determining whether a RICO 
claim with extraterritorial implications can be heard in U.S. courts, at 
least with respect to claims involving injury to intangible assets.  
 
currency of the criminal organizations’ home countries while the euros were sold to 
cigarette importers at a discounted rate to purchase RJR’s cigarettes.  The lawsuit 
alleged that RJR controlled this operation which committed numerous violations of 
the RICO statute as well as violations of New York state law.  The district court 
granted defendants’ dismissal motion based on the presumption that U.S. statutes do 
not apply extraterritorially absent express Congressional intent so indicating.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that claims under the 
RICO statute can apply extraterritorially when the RICO claim is a violation of a 
predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to apply extraterritorially.  The Su-
preme Court then reversed the Second Circuit, and a four-justice majority (Justice 
Sotomayor did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case) held that 
RICO’s private right of action did not rebut the presumption of extraterritorially, and 
therefore a plaintiff must allege there was a “domestic injury” for the lawsuit to pro-
ceed. Because plaintiffs waived their damages claims for domestic injuries, their re-
maining claims were based on injuries suffered abroad requiring dismissal.     
2 18 U.S.C.A §§ 1961 (1)-(10) (West 2016). 
3 136 S. Ct. at 2102-03. 
4 18 U.S.C.A § 1964(c) (West 2019) (“Any person injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any 
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he 
sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee…” ). 
5 136 S. Ct. at 2111 n.13. 
6 See Bascuñan v. Elsaca, 874 F.3d 806, 817 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The guidance from 
the Supreme Court in RJR Nabisco regarding what constitutes a domestic injury is 
admittedly sparse.”).  
7 For a concise summary of how extraterritoriality issues are being applied in 
RICO, securities law, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Commodity Exchange Act, and 
Antitrust Law contexts, see DANIEL SILVER &BENJAMIN A. BERRINGER, THE 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS VOLUME I: GLOBAL 
INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES (Judith Seddon 
et al., ed. 3d. ed. 2019) (available online at https://globalinvestiga-
tionsreview.com/chapter/1153246/extraterritoriality-the-us-perspective). 
2
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Others, rejecting this view, have applied a multi-factor approach to de-
termine whether, in a particular case, injury to intangible property 
should be deemed to constitute  a “domestic injury” for the purposes 
of evaluating whether a foreign entity plaintiff has a sufficient connec-
tion to the U.S. to rebut the presumption against extraterritorial statu-
tory application.     
Exclusive emphasis on a business entity plaintiff’s location to 
determine whether plaintiff has suffered a “domestic injury” is not a 
sound way to determine whether extraterritorial RICO actions can be 
maintained in U.S. courts.  Where, for example, a foreign company is 
doing business in the U.S., and is damaged by U.S. actors’ bad conduct 
in the U.S., it makes little sense to preclude rebuttal of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application, ab initio, just  because plaintiff is 
incorporated in another jurisdiction.  The problem is clearly illustrated 
in cases where a company, for example, has many U.S. shareholders 
derivatively but necessarily injured as a direct consequence of damage 
to the corporation in which they are invested.  The location of a foreign 
corporation’s shareholders should be among the factors used to deter-
mine whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is rebutted.   
While courts routinely and wisely deny shareholders the right 
to assert RICO claims on behalf of a corporation, shareholder rights 
are, nevertheless, protected by the corporation’s ability to bring claims 
through which the individual shareholders will benefit on a pro rata 
basis, with each shareholder benefiting in proportion to the number of 
owned shares.  This “Corporate Standing Doctrine” compensates for 
the individual shareholders’ general inability to assert corporate 
claims.  Sole reliance on a corporation’s residence or place of incorpo-
ration to determine whether is a “domestic injury” exists may lead to 
harsh results particularly where, for example, a substantial number of 
the corporation’s shareholders are located in the U.S.  Consideration 
of the location of a corporation’s shareholders as a substantial factor in 
a multi-factor analysis of whether the injury suffered in an extraterri-
torial RICO claim constitutes a “domestic injury” makes good sense 
and should become part of “domestic injury” jurisprudence. 
Part I discusses the RICO statute, RJR, and certain pre-RJR 
precedents that have addressed how to determine whether a “domestic 
injury” exists.  Part II discusses Second and Seventh Circuits’ post-
RJR cases on “domestic injury” in the context of alleged injury to tan-
gible and intangible property.  Part III discusses post-RJR cases in the 
Ninth and Third Circuits which have, to some extent, rejected the 
3
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approaches taken in the Second and Seventh Circuits.  Part IV dis-
cusses whether shareholder residence should be considered in extrater-
ritoriality analysis in RICO cases, in light of the Corporate Standing 
Doctrine, which consolidates shareholder litigation rights into the 
owned company, for prudential purposes, to assure all shareholders are 
benefitted by a potential corporation recovery.8  
I. PART I 
A. The RICO Statute and its Remedies – Causation, 
Direct Injury and Standing 
Congress, in enacting the RICO statute, provided a remedy for 
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola-
tion of section 1962.”9  To recover under RICO, plaintiff must estab-
lish, among other elements,10 RICO loss causation (which is roughly 
equivalent to securities fraud loss causation and/or common law “prox-
imate causation”), as between the alleged RICO predicate criminal 
act(s) and the injury plaintiff alleges was suffered, as commentators 
 
8 See Laurence A. Steckman and Kenneth Moltner, Recent Developments in Direct 
Injury Analysis in the Second Circuit: An examination of the Injury and Causation 
Elements of RICO Standing, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 5, 1992, at 1, col. 1, 
reprinted 15 RICO L. REP. 274, Feb. 1992. 
9 18 U.S.C.A § 1964 (c).    
10 RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enter-
prise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful 
debt.”  18 U.S.C.A § 1962(c). Section 1964(c) confers a private right of action to 
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of” such a violation. Id. 
§ 1964(c).  See generally Sonterra Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215143; 2018 WL 6725387 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 21, 2018).  To 
state a claim for a civil violation of RICO, plaintiff must plead defendant engaged in 
“(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity 
and, additionally, must establish that (5) the defendant caused injury to plaintiff's 
business or property.”  Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th 
Cir. 2002); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c). 
4
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have made clear.11  RICO remedies include treble damages and the 
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.12 
B. The Key Pre-RJR cases of Morrison and Kiobel 
RJR was decided following a two decades-plus trend in which 
the number of cases brought under statutes with possible extraterrito-
rial impact substantially increased.13  This increase caused concern 
among some international law scholars that extraterritoriality had gone 
too far.14  During the six years prior to the RJR decision, the Court 
addressed the presumption against extraterritoriality twice.15 
Extraterritoriality issues in the securities law and RICO con-
texts often refer to Morrison v. Nat’l. Austl. Bank Ltd.,16 a 2010 
 
11 See generally Laurence A. Steckman and Robert E. Conner, Loss Causation Un-
der Rule 10b-5, a Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis: When Should Representational Mis-
conduct be Deemed the Cause of Legal Injury Under the Federal Securities Law?, 
LAW REPORTER, 1998 SECURITIES ARBITRATION, Vol. 1, Ch. 16, (P.L.I. 1998), 
reprinted RICO Vol. 28, No. 2, at 173 (Aug. 1998), reprinted PRIVATE SECURITIES 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT REPORTER, Vol. 5, No. 6, at 897 (Sept. 1998). 
12 Id.  
13 See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 
93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 818 (2009). 
14 Id. at 874 (“…in the long run, extraterritoriality is not a sustainable way to solve 
global challenges.”). 
15 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665, 1669 (2013); 
See Morrison v. Nat’l. Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
16 Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (2010). In Morrison, the National Australia Bank 
(“NAB”), an Australian company, acquired an American company, Homeside Lend-
ing Inc. (“Homeside”), in 1998.  In 2001, NAB announced it would incur a $450 
million write-down for inaccurately calculating fees Homeside would generate for 
servicing mortgages, which had been calculated as present assets.  Its stock price 
dropped five percent.  Later that year, NAB announced a second write-down of $1.75 
billion to amend other inaccurate calculations booked as present assets.  NAB's stock 
price tumbled an additional thirteen percent.  Subsequently, four NAB stockholders 
filed suit against NAB and Homeside alleging violations of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934.  Three plaintiffs purported to represent a class of non-American 
purchasers of NAB stock because they bought their shares abroad.  The district court 
held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the class of non-American pur-
chasers.  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed, reasoning that subject matter jurisdiction exists over claims only “if the de-
fendant's conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory to fraud, 
and particular acts or culpable failures to act with the United States directly caused 
losses to foreign investors abroad.”  Morrison v. Nat’l. Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 
167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008).  The Court noted that (1) the issuance of fraudulent state-
ments from NAB's corporate headquarters in Australia were more central to the fraud 
5
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decision which concerned the extraterritorial effect of U.S. securities 
laws.  Foreign and U.S. plaintiffs sued foreign issuers for losses on 
transactions on foreign exchanges alleging violations of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.17  Plaintiff’s claims were based on the 1998 
purchase by National Australia Bank of Home Side Lending, a mort-
gage servicing company in Florida.  Plaintiffs sought to apply Ex-
change Act §10(b) anti-fraud provisions to conduct on the Australian 
stock exchange engaged in by defendant National Australia Bank 
(“NAB”).18   
In July 2001, NAB announced a USD 450 write-down in assets 
due to losses associated with Home Side Lending, and a further USD 
1.75 billion write-down in September of that year.  Plaintiffs claimed 
the write-downs were caused by Home Side Lending’s intentionally 
overly-optimistic assumptions, which were part of a scheme to de-
fraud.  By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, only Austral-
ian investors remained as plaintiffs.19 
The Court held that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
cannot be overturned by simply alleging the existence of some domes-
tic activity and it applied a test requiring that the “focus” of the relevant 
statute be pertinent to regulating foreign regulations.20  Because the 
plain language of section 10(b) applies only to U.S. securities, the 
Court held it should not be read to apply to non-U.S. securities, even 
if traded among U.S. investors, on foreign exchanges.  The Court thus 
reversed the Second Circuit, stating:  
 
than Homeside's manipulation of financial data on which NAB based its statements, 
(2) there was no effect on U.S. capital markets, and (3) the lengthy chain of causation 
from NAB receiving inaccurate information from Homeside before passing the in-
formation along to its investors suggested that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The Court affirmed, insofar as it agreed that the case should be dis-
missed, but held that the Second Circuit had erred when it based its decision on the 
question of subject matter over the case.  Instead, the Court held that the Securities 
and Exchange Act does not provide a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing for-
eign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded 
on foreign stock exchanges because “longstanding principle” dictated that Congres-
sional legislation, unless expressly stating otherwise, only applies within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States. 
17 Id. at 250-251. 
18 Id.  
19 The case was named for Morrison, a U.S. party, whose claims were dismissed, 
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[T]he Second Circuit believed the Exchange 
Act’s silence about §10(b)’s extraterritorial application 
permitted the court to ‘discern’ whether Congress 
would have wanted the statute to apply. This disregard 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality has oc-
curred over many decades in many courts of appeals 
and has produced a collection of tests for divining con-
gressional intent that are complex in formulation and 
unpredictable in application. The results demonstrate 
the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity. Rather than guess anew in each case, this Court ap-
plies the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable 
background against which Congress can legislate with 
predictable effects.21    
The Court continued to retract the scope of extraterritorial ap-
plication of statutes in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,22 which 
held that the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATS”) presumptively does not 
apply extraterritorially.23  A group of Nigerian citizens sued the Dutch 
oil corporation for allegedly aiding and abetting the Nigerian govern-
ment in violating international law during the 1990s.  The ATS allows 
non-U.S. citizens to file civil actions against organizations violating 
international law or U.S. treaties.  The Court ruled the ATS did not 
apply because “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United 
States.”24  It further held that: “even where the claims touch and con-
cern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion.”25   
The Kiobel ruling created the “touch and concern” test, which, 
in extraterritorial cases, requires a foreign organization’s conduct to 
have taken place and/or created significant repercussions in the U.S.26  
After Kiobel, there was confusion over whether it had failed to apply 
the “focus” test or if the use of the language “touch and concern” called 
for a different conclusion, at least in the ATS context.27      
 
21 Id. at 248. 
22 133 S. Ct. 1659. 
23 28 U.S.C.A § 1350 (West 2019). 
24 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 1669-70. 
7
Steckman, and Rader,: RICO Extraterritoriality
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
1350 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
C. RJR, the Domestic Injury Requirement and 
Methodology  
In RJR, the Court held that a RICO plaintiff must allege a “do-
mestic” injury to recover RICO remedies.  However, since the plaintiff 
waived its claims for domestic injuries,28 the RJR Court did not need 
to set forth a precise test of how to determine whether a “domestic 
injury” existed.29  However, the Court provided at least some method-
ological guidance to courts examining extraterritoriality questions. 
Essentially, courts begin with the presumption that federal stat-
utes apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.,30 a “pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.”31  The presumption is intended to 
prevent “unintended clashes between our laws and those of other na-
tions which could result in international discord.”32  Courts begin by 
asking whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been re-
butted,33 and rebuttal is deemed to have occurred only if the statutory 
text provides a “clear indication of an extraterritorial application.”34  
If the presumption against extraterritoriality is not rebutted, the 
court then asks “whether the case involves a domestic application of 
the statute.”35  To determine whether a domestic application is in-
volved requires the court to identify the statute’s “focus” and, in par-
ticular, to determine whether conduct relevant to that “focus” occurred 
in the U.S.36  If so, the case will be deemed to involve a permissible 
“domestic application” of the statute.37  The Court explained that a 
statute’s focus is “the objec[t] of [its] solicitude,”38 which can include 
the conduct it seeks to regulate, as well as the parties and interests it 
 
28 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111. 
29 Id.  See also Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F.3d 694, 700 (3d Cir. 
2018) (“…since the plaintiffs in RJR Nabisco had waived their claims for domestic 
injuries, the Court did not need to explain how courts should determine whether an 
alleged injury has been suffered domestically or abroad.”). 
30 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
31 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100. 
32 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991).  
33 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2093-94. 
34 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010). 
35 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2093-94. 
36 Id. at 2094. 
37 Id. 
38 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (quoting Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers 
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)). 
8
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seeks to protect or vindicate.39  “If the conduct relevant to the statute’s 
focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a permissi-
ble domestic application” of the statute.40  This will be true “even if 
other conduct occurred abroad.”41  But if the relevant conduct occurred 
in another country -- “then the case involves an impermissible extra-
territorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in 
U. S. territory.”42  When determining the focus of a statute, if the stat-
utory provision at issue works in tandem with other provisions, it must 
be assessed in concert with those other provisions.43  Otherwise, the 
Court reasoned, it would be impossible to accurately determine 
whether the application of the statute in the case is a “domestic appli-
cation.”44 
D. RJR, the Dissent and Subsequent Judicial 
Interpretations of Domestic Injury  
Justice Ginsburg concurred in part, dissented in part, and dis-
sented from the judgment in RJR.  Joined by Justices Breyer and Ka-
gan, she wrote: “[d]enying respondents a remedy under RICO, the 
Court today reads into §1964(c) a domestic-injury requirement for 
suits by private plaintiffs nowhere indicated in the statute’s text.”45  
She recited the facts constituting the alleged scheme to illustrate why 
“pinning a domestic-injury requirement onto §1964(c) makes little 
sense.”46  In contrast to the majority, she noted that the alleged racket-
eering activity, directed and managed from the U.S. and involving con-
duct occurring in the U.S. -- “has the United States written all over 
it.”47  The dissenting Justices also pointed out that RICO’s private 
 
39 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267. 
40 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2094. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 2105. 
44 Id. at 2108; See generally Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co. 
v. Hu, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471, 2017 WL 3328239 (S.D.N.Y. August 3, 2017) 
(“After RJR, putative RICO violations are construed narrowly to adhere to the well-
established presumption against extraterritoriality.”). 
45 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2112 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and 
Kagan, J.J.). 
46 Id. at 2114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Kagan, J.J.). 
47 Id. at 2114-2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Kagan, J.J.). 
9
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damages remedies were based upon the Clayton Act, which applies to 
foreign injuries.48   
As discussed below, application of RJR’s domestic injury re-
quirement in the district courts is very much in flux.  The extent to 
which courts rely heavily or solely on a corporate plaintiff’s residence, 
as opposed to a wider array of factors, will determine whether RICO 
cases involving foreign corporate plaintiffs which “ha[ve] the United 
States written all over” them will be able to maintain otherwise action-
able RICO scheme in U.S. courts.  Notably, the RJR majority did not 
explain what constitutes “domestic injury,”49 and courts have, since 
then, recognized there is “no established test for determining whether 
an injury to business or property occurs domestically.”50 
In a heavily cited district case, Akishev v. Kapustin,51 an alleg-
edly fraudulent Internet used car ring was operating out of Russia and 
misrepresenting an inventory of cars in the U.S.  The district judge 
acknowledged that RJR set different standards of extraterritoriality for 
RICO’s reach as a criminal statute versus that of a private civil cause 
of action.  For criminal actions, the RICO enterprise must be engaged 
in commerce with the U.S., and the predicate acts must either occur in 
the U.S. or must themselves apply extraterritorially.52  For private civil 
actions, focus is not on the enterprise, but “where the private RICO 
plaintiff suffered his injury.”53   
RJR had held: “‘Section 1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff 
to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or property and does 
not allow recovery for foreign injuries.’”54  The Akishev opinion 
pointed out that the Court had itself cautioned that “‘[t]he application 
of [the domestic injury] rule in any given case will not always be self-
evident, as disputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged injury 
 
48 Id. at 2113-2114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Kagan, J.J.). 
49 Elsevier Inc. v. Grossman, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103444, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 4, 2016) (citing European Community, 136 S. Ct. at 2111), corrected on other 
grds., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167211 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016). 
 
50 Elsevier Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103444, at *34. 
51 Akishev v. Kapustin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169787 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016). 
52 Akishev, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169787, at *15 (citing and quoting European 
Community, 136 S. Ct. at 2015); See also Elsevier Inc. v. Grossman, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 103444, at *27–28 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) (noting and quoting European 
Community, 136 S. Ct. at 2015 “‘Congress did not limit RICO to domestic enter-
prises.””). 
53 Akishev, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169787, at *15. 
54 Id. at *16 (quoting European Community, 136 S. Ct. at 2111). 
10
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is ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic.’”55  Rejecting the contention that the plain-
tiff’s residence in Russia was determinative of the site of injury, the 
district court held that the locus delicti of the crime (internet offerings 
of used cars allegedly located in New Jersey and Pennsylvania), was 
sufficient to qualify as a “domestic injury.”  Some courts have since 
held that the domestic injury may be determined solely by the legal site 
of plaintiff’s injury, and not by the place of defendant’s conduct,56 
whereas other courts have rejected this view in favor of a multi-factor 
analysis which includes whether foreign conduct targeted plaintiff in 
the U.S.57      
II. PART II 
The Second Circuit, in 2017, in Bascuñan v. Elsacan,58 ad-
dressed RJR and the standards to be applied in evaluating the “domes-
tic injury” requirement in RICO cases.59  Plaintiff, a resident of Chile, 
sued for civil RICO damages arising from four schemes, each involv-
ing theft of funds and/or shares.  Defendants argued RJR’s extraterri-
toriality test compelled dismissal because the foreign plaintiff had to 
be deemed to have suffered injury in the country of its residence, and, 
thus, plaintiff could not allege a “domestic injury.”60  Judge Daniels 
dismissed the case, applying a “residency test,”61 but the Second Cir-
cuit, observing it is not always “self-evident” when an injury is “do-
mestic,” reversed.62  
 
55 Akishev, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169787, at *16–17 (quoting European Commu-
nity, 136 S. Ct. at 2111). 
56 See, e.g., Bascuñan v. Elsaca, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133664, at **17-18 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016), rev’d and remanded, 874 F.3d 809 (2d Cir. 2017). 
57 See, e.g., Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1155 (C.D. 
Cal. 2016) (disagreeing with and expressly refusing to follow the district court deci-
sion in Bascuñan).  Subsequent to the Tatung decision, the Second Circuit reversed 
the district court’s dismissal of all claims in Bascuñan.  The district court had held 
that plaintiff could not establish domestic injury, because plaintiff was a citizen and 
resident of Chile.  The Second Circuit reversed with respect to injury to “tangible 
property,” holding injury to tangible property located in the United States constitutes 
a “domestic injury” for the purposes of a RICO claim.  However, the Second Circuit 
also held the plaintiff’s injuries to intangible property did not constitute a “domestic 
injury| in view of plaintiff’s foreign citizenship and residence. 
58 874 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 2017). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 809. 
61 Id. 
62 Id at 817. 
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At that time, no Circuit level court had considered exactly how 
to determine whether a civil RICO claim was “domestic,” a critical 
issue the Second Circuit needed to resolve.  The Second Circuit held 
that two of the alleged schemes failed to allege “domestic injury.”  
What was relevant to those schemes was that defendant stole funds 
owned by a foreign corporation, held in a foreign bank account and, 
although defendant transferred the funds through U.S. located accounts 
as part of its effort to conceal the thefts, no “domestic injury” was al-
leged because the only domestic connections were defendant’s acts.   
The key extraterritoriality question, the Circuit held, was where plain-
tiff was injured, not where defendant was located when plaintiff was 
injured, even if proximately, by defendant’s RICO-violating miscon-
duct.  
The other two schemes survived an RJR-dismissal because tan-
gible property, money and bearer shares, were physically located in the 
U.S., when stolen.  Distinguishing injury to tangible and intangible 
property, Bascuñan held that where tangible property is located in the 
U.S., injury occurs where the property is located, regardless of where 
plaintiff is located, and regardless of where defendant’s alleged injury-
causing actions occurred.  Bascuñan thus held that, in some circum-
stances, a foreign plaintiff can allege “domestic injury” sufficient to 
benefit from RICO remedies, rejecting the proposition that a resi-
dency-based test is sufficient, in all cases, to determine extraterritori-
ality.  Bascuñan thus makes clear that the test for whether an injury is 
“domestic” is fundamentally factual and may depend on issues includ-
ing whether the damaged property is appropriately characterized as 
“tangible” or “intangible,” a characterization which may itself require 
factual hearing, depending on the facts in issue. 
In Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp.63 the 
Seventh Circuit held that a “tangible asset” is one “that has a physical 
existence and is capable of being assigned a value.”64  A dispositive 
question was whether a judgment (or a cause of action) was a “tangible 
asset.”  The Seventh Circuit explained that although a judgment is doc-
umented by a piece of paper, the “judgment” really does not have a 
“physical existence.”  Rather, as property, a judgment is an “intangible 
 
63 885 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2018). 
64 Id. at 1094 (citing definition of “Tangible Asset,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009)). 
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asset,” one that “can be amortized or converted to cash, such as patents 
… or a right to something, such as services paid for in advance.”65  
The Seventh Circuit continued: 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Bascuñán fo-
cused on how to address situations involving tangible 
property. Here, we must determine where to locate an 
injury to intangible property. As we noted above, the 
Supreme Court directs us to focus on where the injury 
is suffered. To “suffer” is “[t]o experience or sustain … 
[an] injury.” Suffer, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009). It is well understood that a party experiences or 
sustains injuries to its intangible property at its resi-
dence, which for a corporation like Armada is its prin-
cipal place of business.”66  
In a heavily cited case, Elsevier Inc. v. Grossman (Elsevier 
III),67 a foreign plaintiff was held entitled to trial on the issue of 
whether it suffered “domestic injury” where defendants allegedly en-
gaged in scheme to obtain journal subscriptions at discounted rates and 
resell the subscriptions to institutions otherwise obligated to pay full 
price, where journals shipped from the U.S. and/or were authorized for 
shipment by plaintiff’s employees in the U.S.68  The defense argued 
any competitive injury must have occurred outside the U.S. because 
plaintiff neither established it parted with journals in the U.S., nor had 
employees in the U.S. that authorized journal shipments to Brazil.  
Plaintiff ultimately proved 48 of 51 fraudulent subscriptions were 
shipped from the U.S. or were authorized for shipment by an Elsevier 
employee in the U.S.  Because 48 of 51 subscriptions were “linked to 
the United States,” plaintiff obtained summary judgment: 
Elsevier relinquished control of the journals in 
the United States under false pretenses and thereby suf-
fered the effects of Grossman’s conduct in the States… 
Even if Elsevier were a foreign entity, this harm would 
suffice to constitute a domestic injury for RICO 
 
65 Id. at 1094 (referencing not only the definition of “intangible asset” in BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), but also referencing Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 
U.S. 1, 12 (1928) (concluding that right to receive money was “a chose in action, and 
an intangible”)).   
66 Id. at 1094. 
67 12 Civ. 5121, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182859, 2017 WL 5135992 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 3, 2017). 
68 Id.  at **9-10. 
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purposes…[J]ournal sales are Elsevier’s stock-in-trade, 
and by sending those goods to Grossman (and, in turn, 
undisclosed Brazilian institutions) through U.S. chan-
nels under the false pretense that Grossman sought the 
journals for personal use.  Elsevier suffered injury in 
the United States.  Elsevier is thus entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law on its RICO claim, as its only unsat-
isfied element was that of domestic injury.69 
Elsevier does not provide general guidance as to how to deter-
mine whether an injury is “domestic” or “foreign,” but it does make 
clear “extraterritoriality” analysis is highly fact sensitive.70  In Else-
vier, the domestic nature of the injury was only determined after a trial.  
In some cases, even very substantial numbers of detailed predicates 
have been found insufficient.71   
 
69 Id. at **11-12.   
70 Id. at **7-12. 
71 See, e.g., Sonterra Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 15-CV-
3538, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215143; 2018 WL 6725387 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 21, 2018) 
(allegation that 50 wires were used insufficient -- “Defendants used U.S. wires to 
deliver false Sterling LIBOR submissions into the U.S. by Thomson Reuters, (CAC  
33); (2) Deutsche Bank engaged in “‘Monday Risk Calls,’ in which traders in New 
York, London, Tokyo, and Frankfurt discussed with a supervisor their trading posi-
tions and strategies in relation to LIBOR rates,” and received directives “promoting 
manipulation . . . , collusion, and other improper conduct” from this supervisor, (CAC  
58); (3) Defendant RBS transacted in Sterling LIBOR-based derivatives with coun-
terparties in the United States, (id. 71); (4) “at least one senior UBS manager in its 
Stamford, Connecticut headquarters directly manipulated UBS’s LIBOR submis-
sions,” and “directed UBS LIBOR submitters to similarly manipulate LIBOR sub-
missions,” (id.  85); (5) Defendants Barclays, UBS, RBS, and Deutsche Bank en-
gaged in LIBOR-based transactions from within the United States during the Class 
Period, (id.  93–94, 96); (6) Defendant Deutsche Bank’s conduct “originated from 
within its Global Finance and Foreign Exchange (‘GFFX’) business unit,” which 
“extended to GFFX desks abroad including in New York,” (id.  14); (7) in a settle-
ment with the New York State Department of Financial Services, Deutsche Bank 
admitted that its New York Branch manipulated the Sterling LIBOR, (id.  53, 55); 
and (8) Defendant RBS employs traders responsible for trading LIBOR-based instru-
ments in New York, (id.  69) – these allegations fell “short of demonstrating that the 
acts of wire fraud in this case were domestic in nature.”  Judge Broderick, holding 
that it was “clear that the scheme was principally foreign in nature and only inci-
dentally touched the United States” and citing Petróleos, explained that “[s]imply 
alleging some domestic conduct occurred cannot support a claim of domestic appli-
cation” of RICO.  Sonterra Capital, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215143 at ** 71-72 (cit-
ing Petróleos Mexicanos, 572 F. App’x at 61).   
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Courts continue to look where the misconduct occurred as a 
factor in determining whether a domestic injury is alleged,72 but courts 
have taken different analytical approaches as several have recog-
nized.73 
In Dandong Old N.-E.  Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co. v. 
Hu,74 for example, plaintiff alleged RICO domestic injuries based on 
defendants’ alleged price-inflation scheme including damage to Plain-
tiff’s reputation in the U.S. soybean market.  Plaintiff alleged that ac-
tions causing the injury took place primarily in the U.S., that scheme 
 
72 See, e.g., Akishev v. Kapustin, No. 13-CV-7152, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169787 
(D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016), 2016 WL 7165714, at *8 (U.S.D.C., N.J. Dec. 8, 2016) (do-
mestic injury found where foreign plaintiff defrauded by U.S.-based internet car 
dealers where “the locus delecti of the crimes is committed in the United States.”). 
73 See, e.g., Dandong Old N.-E.  Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co. v. Hu,  No. 15 
Civ. 10015, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471, 2017 WL 3228239 (S.D.N.Y. August 
3, 2017) at **27-28, (“[RJR]… left open the question of determining what constitutes 
a domestic injury, and federal district courts ‘have diverged in their analysis 
thereof.’”  Citing Elsevier III, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69677, at *4.  In general, courts 
have adopted one of two lines of reasoning: “[t]he first line ... focuses on where the 
alleged injury was suffered. The second line ... focuses on where the conduct oc-
curred that caused the injury.”  Id.  (citing Cevdet Aksüt Oğullari Koll. Sti v. Ca-
vusoglu, No. 14-CV- 3362, 2017, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45325, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 
2017)).  In an earlier case, this Court reviewed both lines of reasoning and adopted 
the former, locus-of-effects approach.  See Elsevier, Inc. v. Grossman, 199 F. Supp. 
3d 768, 781-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Elsevier II”), order clarified sub nom. Elsevier 
Inc. v. Grossmann, No. 12 Civ. 5121 (KPF), 2016 WL 7077037 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 
2016).  This approach determines the existence of a domestic injury by focusing on 
where the plaintiff felt the effects of the injury, and not where the defendant commit-
ted the injury-inducing acts.  A two-step analysis determines where a plaintiff suf-
fered an injury.  First, the Court determines “what type of injury a RICO plaintiff has 
suffered.”  Id. at 786.  Second, if the plaintiff has suffered an injury to its business, 
then the Court asks, “where substantial negative business consequences occurred.”  
Id.  Other courts in this District have similarly concluded that a domestic injury is 
determined with reference to where the plaintiff feels the extent of the harm.  See, 
e.g., Bascuñan v. Daniel Yarur ELS Amended Complaint A, No. 15 Civ. 2009 
(GBD), 2016 WL 5475998, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (observing that when 
determining “where an economic injury accrued, courts typically ask two common-
sense questions: [1] who became poorer, and [2] where did they become poorer.’ … 
This inquiry usually focuses upon where the economic impact of the injury was ulti-
mately felt.’” (internal citations omitted)).  These courts have generally found that a 
domestic injury to a plaintiff’s business accrues “where the loss is suffered, which in 
the fraud context, is where the economic impact is felt, normally the plaintiff’s resi-
dence.”  City of Almaty, 226 F. Supp. 3d at 282 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Gorlin v. Bond Richman & Co., 706 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).”).  
74 Dandong Old N.-E.  Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co. v. Hu, No. 15-CV-10015, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2017). 
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participants were U.S. domiciled (and employed in the U.S.), that the 
soybeans were grown and purchased in the U.S., and that defendants 
garnered much of their illicit profits in the U.S.75  Plaintiff relied 
largely on Tatung Co. v. Shu Tze Hsu,76 which “squarely rejected the 
view that a domestic injury occurs only where a foreign corporation 
feels the effects wrongful conduct.”  Dandong, however, noted courts 
in New York’s Southern District had repeatedly rejected the legal un-
derpinnings of Tatung which expressly declined to follow the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Bascuñan, after determining a domestic injury oc-
curs where defendant directs his fraudulent acts.77  Dandong contin-
ued:  
Judge Nathan, in the Almaty decision, “share[d] 
the Tatung court’s hesitation to broadly endorse an ab-
solutist version of the [domestic injury] rule that would, 
for example, categorically preclude foreign corpora-
tions with business operations or property interests 
maintained in the U.S. from bringing RICO actions to 
recover for injuries to those assets.” City of Almaty, Ka-
zakhstan v. Ablyazov, 226 F. Supp. 3d 272, 284 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 
15 Civ. 5345 (AJN), 2017 WL 1424326 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
20, 2017). This Court finds that the facts of this case, as 
did the facts in Almaty, “present[] no such circum-
stances”… Bascuñan… defined a domestic injury to 
occur “where the plaintiff suffered the injury, not at all 
where the defendant’s alleged conduct took place.” 
Id.78 
Plaintiff argued a domestic injury is incurred if the fraud “had 
some effect on . . . relationships with actual or prospective [United 
States] customers,” under Elsevier II,79 as it claimed defendants’ 
scheme damaged plaintiff’s relationship with U.S. soybean suppliers, 
causing harm to its “business reputation within the insular soybean 
community.”  The court, however, distinguished Elsevier, observing 
that in the case before it, plaintiff claimed a domestic injury with re-
spect to soybean contracts shipped outside the U.S. -- so any 
 
75 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471 at *36.  
76 217 F.Supp.3d 1138, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2016).  
77 Dandong, 2017 LEXIS 122471 at *30.   
78 Id. at *30, n.7.  
79 199 F. Supp. 3d 768, 788 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 [2020], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/11
2020 RICO EXTRATERRITORIALITY 1359 
deprivation of plaintiff’s money was felt in China.80  It was not de-
prived of property in the U.S. because plaintiff received all the soy-
beans for which it contracted with U.S. suppliers that shipped the com-
modity outside the U.S.81  
So, the court explained, while Defendants’ conduct may have 
impaired Plaintiff’s later ability to secure soybean suppliers in the 
U.S., loss of potential business opportunities is not a RICO cognizable 
domestic injury -- the expectation of continued contract counterparties 
among U.S. soybean suppliers is “far too attenuated to suffice” as a 
domestic injury under RICO.  The court similarly rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that defendants’ price manipulation caused it specific mon-
etary losses in the form of overpayment on each soybean contract and 
increased costs associated with letters of credit, interest, and insurance 
so that by the conclusion of the scheme, damage to plaintiff’s reputa-
tion led to its processing plant closing for a month and operating at a 
substantially reduced capacity. The court also noted that in Cevdet, the 
district court rejected the reasoning in Tatung in favor of Elsevier, 
agreeing that the “more persuasive” domestic injury test looks to where 
the plaintiff suffered the injury, not where the RICO predicate acts oc-
curred.82  The court also cited Exeed Indus., LLC v. Younis,83 wherein 
it was determined that an industrial material supplier did not suffer a 
domestic injury because “the initial injury that impacted Plaintiffs” oc-
curred in the United Arab Emirates “where [its] business and economic 
operations [were] centered”).84  The court concluded that, like the 
Turkish food supplier in Cevdet, which “only felt the harmful effects 
of the food importer’s conversion scheme at its Turkish home base, 
Plaintiff here only felt the effects of Defendants’ overpricing scheme 
in China.”85  
 
80 Dandong, No. 15 Civ. 10015, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471, 2017 WL 
3228239 at **32-33. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at *35. 
83 No. 15-CV- 14, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154487, 2016 WL 6599949, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 8, 2016). 
84 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154487 at * 8.  
85 Dandong, No. 15 Civ. 10015, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471, 2017 WL 
3228239 at *14.  The court explained that after Defendants allegedly overpriced the 
soybean contracts and siphoned the excess funds, plaintiff terminated ninety employ-
ees and reduced its soybean production in its Dandong City factory and while plain-
tiff incurred attorneys’ fees in the U.S., those expenses were paid from China – so 
regardless of where the conspirators’ conduct took place, plaintiff’s injury was felt 
in China, the only place its business had ever been located.  Id. at *36. 
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In the Seventh Circuit case of Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. 
Amcol Int’l Corp.,86 plaintiff, a Singapore shipping company sued an 
Illinois defendant for impairing its efforts to recover on contract breach 
claim.  Relying on the rule that a party experiences or sustains injury 
to its property at its residence, the Seventh Circuit, with little commen-
tary, held that because plaintiff’s principal place of business was Sin-
gapore, any harm to its intangible bundle of litigation rights must have 
been suffered in Singapore and so plaintiff lacked a domestic injury.87  
Its singular focus on residence, however, has been rejected by the Third 
Circuit as too narrow an inquiry to be helpful in more complex cases 
raising extraterritoriality issues, as discussed in detail in Part III.88 
In a particularly interesting recent district court decision arising 
in the First Circuit, Government of Bermuda v. Lahey Clinic, Inc.,89 
the Government of Bermuda (“Bermuda”) sued a clinic and hospital 
alleging bribes and other misconduct.  Plaintiff, alleging three RICO 
schemes, argued its claims were a permissible domestic application of 
§ 1964(c), relying on Tatung Co., Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu,90  and Akishev 
v. Kapustin.91  The court, observing that most courts did not focus on 
where the RICO predicate acts occurred, but where plaintiffs’ injuries 
were felt, a point it noted was made in Cevdet Aksut Ogullari Koll. Sti 
v. Cavusoglu,92 did not find plaintiff’s arguments persuasive.  The case 
illustrates some of the difficulties in applying the rules the courts have 
articulated.  
The first scheme, referred to as the “scanning scheme,” in-
volved defendants conducting medically unnecessary scans at two on-
island clinics (the “Brown Clinics”) and interpreting imaging results 
forwarded electronically from the Brown Clinics in Bermuda to Lahey, 
in Massachusetts.  Patient referrals for diagnostic scanning at the 
 
86 885 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2018). 
87 Id. at 1095.  
88 Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F.3d 694, 709 (3d Cir. 2018) (“…we 
think the Armada rule is too inflexible to be used in resolving cases where the nature 
of the injured property interest is not ‘self-evident.’”). 
89 No. 17-cv-10242-IT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3896, 2018 WL 1243954 *1 
(D.MA Mar. 8, 2018). 
90 217 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (foreign corporation suffered a 
domestic injury when it was harmed “in the course of doing business” in the U.S.). 
91 No. CV 13-7152(NLH) (AMD), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169787, 2016 WL 7165714 
*1 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016) (finding domestic injury when foreign plaintiffs “traveled” 
to the U.S. via the internet and purchased cars falsely advertised on a U.S.-based 
website that were never delivered or were otherwise misrepresented). 
92 245 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (D.N.J. 2017). 
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Brown Clinics were obtained through local physician kickbacks result-
ing in thousands of medically unnecessary tests, at Bermuda’s ex-
pense.  These tests were paid for by Bermuda public insurers, causing 
the Standard Premium Rate for the Standard Health Benefits package 
provided to each Bermudian citizen to more than doubled between fis-
cal 2007 and 2016 and, therefore, insured Bermudians paid higher pre-
miums and Bermuda paid higher subsidies.  The court, rejecting plain-
tiff’s argument, found payments for the scans were made by the Brown 
Clinics out of their own accounts so the “relevant property always re-
mained abroad, and these injuries did not arise from any pre-existing 
connection between [the plaintiff] and the United States.”93  The trans-
actions, moreover, allegedly resulted in unnecessary payments in Ber-
muda and so did not cause injury to U.S. business or property as the 
complaint did not allege these payments, i.e., money (tangible prop-
erty), were made from U.S. bank accounts.94  Citing Bascuñán, it held 
the original geographic location of misappropriated funds was control-
ling, and, no domestic injury existed as there was no U.S. misappro-
priation of domestic funds.95  The alleged increase on premium costs 
paid by the insured population and level of subsidies Bermuda paid 
were not a “domestic injury” because Bermuda did not allege the 
Standard Health Benefits or Standard Premium Rate applied to reim-
bursements outside Bermuda, and did not allege insurance reimburse-
ments for scans conducted in Bermuda were paid from U.S.-based ac-
counts.96  
The second scheme, referred to as the “Bidding Scheme,” in-
volved two subcontracts, the first, to develop a long-term healthcare 
strategy for the island and “revamp” Bermuda’s state-run hospital, 
King Edward Memorial Hospital (“KEMH”) and, the other, to develop 
“FutureCare,” a Bermudian public insurance plan.  With respect to the 
latter subcontract, Brown allegedly used his “influence and connec-
tions” to ensure that Lahey was favored over other potential U.S. 
healthcare providers, including Johns Hopkins, for contracts relating 
to “FutureCare.”    
The court held that assuming the alleged conduct inflicted the 
type of “competitive injury” prohibited by RICO’s substantive 
 
93 Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 874 F. 3d 806, 819 (2d Cir. 2017). 
94 Gov’t. of Bermuda v. Lahey Clinic, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38696 at **12-
15. 
95 Id. at *14. 
96 Id. at **14-15. 
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provisions, both projects involved Bermuda-based work whose effects 
were felt in Bermuda.  Plaintiff did not allege payments for the Kurron 
America project or any other KEMH-related work were made from 
Bermuda’s U.S.-based bank accounts.97  Although Bermuda alleged 
Lahey physicians traveled to Bermuda from Massachusetts, saw pa-
tients at the state-run hospital and that Lahey secured a prestigious ap-
pointment as a Clinical Advisor for KEMH’s General Surgery and 
Outpatient Care services, these were Bermuda-based.98  Although Ber-
muda alleged Brown used influence to assure Lahey was favored over 
other potential U.S. healthcare providers, including Johns Hopkins, for 
“FutureCare” contracts, FutureCare was a Bermudian public insurer 
reimbursing healthcare costs of Bermudian residents.99  No injury 
arose from these contracts in the U.S.  Although Johns Hopkins, whose 
domestic profits might have been competitively injured might have a 
domestic injury, Bermuda did not.100 
In the third scheme, referred to as the “Preferred Provider 
Scheme,” Bermuda public insurers made Lahey a “preferred provider” 
of medically necessary services not available in Bermuda and, as a re-
sult, Lahey treated “[h]undreds of Bermudians” who travel to Lahey in 
Massachusetts each year for treatment, and it services Bermudians re-
motely from its campus in Massachusetts.  Bermuda claimed injury to 
U.S. property based on Bermuda’s payment of tens of millions of dol-
lars from and through U.S. bank accounts to Lahey, in the U.S., for ser-
vices Lahey corruptly obtained and carried out in the U.S.  Because 
Bermuda alleged payment for these services was made “from and/or 
through Bermuda’s bank accounts, or those of its agents, in the United 
States,”101 the court found the domestic injury requirement was met, 
on the assumption payment through a domestic agent is analogous to 
domestic payment by a principal.102   
However, Bermuda claimed it was injured by paying for “over-
seas services in the United States tainted by bribes.”103  This basically 
meant, the court held, that because Lahey “potentially obtained a 
greater opportunity to service Bermudian residents by becoming a pre-
ferred provider through bribery, paying Lahey for even 
 
97 Id. at **15-17. 
98 Id. at *16. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at *17. 
101 Id. at **17-20. 
102 Id. at *17.  
103 Id. at *18. 
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medically necessary services is inherently injurious to Bermuda.”104  
The court held that Bermuda failed to show the preferred provider 
scheme led to an economic injury. 
Although, as a preferred provider, Lahey provided “medically 
necessary services not available in Bermuda” to Bermudians traveling 
abroad, Bermuda did not allege Bermuda paid more for Lahey’s ser-
vices than it would have, with another provider, or that Bermudian pa-
tients received lower-quality services, or that Bermuda paid for any 
services for which it would not have paid otherwise.105  It held that 
Bermuda’s involvement in the claims adjudication process illustrates 
Lahey’s provision of these services did not injure Bermuda economi-
cally.  Bermuda “negotiate[d] agreements for covered services and es-
tablished rates with overseas providers,”106 and each claim for services 
was adjudicated “pursuant to policies set by the Bermudian Govern-
ment” by Bermuda’s claims processing agents who “specialize in cost 
containment.”107  
The court concluded that while a case might be brought by a 
plaintiff who could allege competitive injury as a result of this scheme, 
such as by Lahey’s U.S. competitors, Bermuda failed to allege it suf-
fered costs it would not have otherwise incurred.108  
The court dismissed the RICO claims. 
III. PART III 
A. The Third Circuit -- Humphrey v. 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC 
While Bascuñan held that a foreign corporation’s place of in-
corporation should be the sole determinant of whether an intangible 
injury should be labeled a “domestic injury,” and other cases cited in 
Part II above also require that a plaintiff’s place of incorporation be the 
determining factor in evaluating whether injury to intangible property 
constitutes a “domestic injury,” other  cases have employed a multi-
factor analysis.  The rationale for using a multi-factor analysis is per-
haps most clearly stated in Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC,109 
 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at *19. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. at **19-20. 
109 905 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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where plaintiff alleged that the reputation and goodwill of its Chinese 
business was destroyed by defendants’ fraudulent acts and the RICO 
question before the court was whether plaintiff’s injury was domestic 
or foreign.  Noting that RJR provided little guidance as to how to de-
termine where an injury was suffered,110 and that the Second Circuit, 
construing RJR, had rejected a bright-line rule limiting RICO claims 
to U.S. residents based solely on the “location of the plaintiff’s corpo-
ration,”111 it concluded that “[a] domestic injury under § 1964(c) is 
found where the relevant factors, appropriately weighed, establish that 
the alleged harm was suffered in the United States.”112  The Third Cir-
cuit noted some courts applied a “locus of effects” test, focused on 
where plaintiff felt the effects of injury, rather than where the injurious 
acts took place and, so, largely focused on plaintiff’s residence or prin-
cipal place of business; others focused on where misconduct was “tar-
geted” or “directed.”113  
Discussing Bascuñan, it noted that the Second Circuit was ad-
dressing tangible property in the U.S. and, therefore, reasoned plaintiff 
had a right to expect U.S. laws to apply to any damage to that property 
– similar reasoning suggested that rule should extend to a foreign plain-
tiff with U.S.-located property.114  Noting that Humphrey’s alleged in-
juries were to intangible business interests, i.e., reputation and good-
will, it observed that relying on tangible factors such as location of lost 
funds, damage to property or plaintiff’s residence would be of little 
analytical use and it stated could even be “very misleading.”115   
 
110 Id. at 700. (“…since the plaintiffs in RJR Nabisco had waived their claims for 
domestic injuries, the Court did not need to explain how courts should determine 
whether an alleged injury has been suffered domestically or abroad.  Moreover, as 
the District Court observed here, there is a dearth of case law grappling with the RJR 
Nabisco decision.  In addition, those courts that have considered whether an alleged 
injury was suffered in the United States have applied varying standards.  Thus, there 
is no consensus on what specific factors must be considered when deciding whether 
an injury is domestic or foreign.”).  
111  Id. at 704 (eschewing reliance on “location of the plaintiff’s residence or the 
defendant’s alleged misconduct”) (citing Bascuñan v. Elsaca, 874 F.3d 809, 820-21 
(2d Cir. 2017). 
112 Id. at 707. 
113 Id. at 701-02. 
114 Id. at 703. 
115 Id. at 702. 
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Rejecting a bright-line, one-size-fits-all approach,116 the Third 
Circuit held a court should employ a fact-sensitive  “multi-factor” test 
that examines, among other things: plaintiff’s residency, the location 
of plaintiff’s principal place of business, where plaintiff performs ser-
vices, where agreements are entered and what law governs those agree-
ments, where underlying factual events – such as meetings or fraudu-
lent statements occurred,117 and whether plaintiff has assets and offices 
in the U.S., with no factor being presumptively dispositive.118  
Noting plaintiffs lived in China (the location of their principal 
place of business), that services were provided in China, that the rele-
vant consultancy agreement was entered into in China and that Chinese 
law was designated to apply (in fact, a case cover sheet indicated the 
 
116 Id. at 707 (“…the applicable factors depend on the plaintiff’s allegations; no 
one factor is presumptively dispositive.”). 
117 Id.  The court discussed Cevdet Aksut Ogullari Koll Sti v. Cavusoglu, 245 
F.Supp.3d 650 (D.N.J. 2017) in which the District Court, focusing on the fact the 
business was located and operated out of Turkey, found no domestic injury occurred 
even though plaintiff claimed it lost U.S.-based customers.  That court, nevertheless, 
held, in principle, that a foreign corporation with “‘substantial business operations 
within the United States’ could, hypothetically, assert a RICO domestic injury be-
cause the injury could be felt in the U.S.”  Id. at 704. (citing and quoting Cevdet).  
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the Cevdet Court explained that while harm to phys-
ical property is deemed to occur where the property is located, where injury is to 
intangible business interests, the focus should be on where the effects of the predicate 
acts are experienced, citing the Humphrey factors.  Cevdet Askut Ogullari Koll Sti 
v. Cavusoglu, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 32492, 2018 WL 6016549 (3d Cir. November 
16, 2018).  The Third Circuit in Humphrey also discussed Elsevier, 199 F.Supp.3d 
768, 786 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) noting that, there, the District Court, observing that alt-
hough a domestic injury could be shown by alleging an “effect” on Plaintiffs’ rela-
tionships with actual or prospective U.S. customers, no such allegations were 
pleaded.  Elsevier, 199 F.Supp.3d at 788.  On post-trial motions, the court held that 
because plaintiff relinquished control of the journals in the U.S., it suffered the ef-
fects in the U.S. and, therefore, a domestic injury occurred.  Elsevier explained “[i]f 
the plaintiff has suffered an injury to his or her business, the court should ask where 
substantial negative business consequences occurred.  By contrast, if the plaintiff has 
suffered an injury to his or her property, the court should ask where the plaintiff 
parted with the property or where the property was damaged.”  905 F.3d at 705, n.72. 
118 The court also discussed Dandong Old N.-E. Agric. & Animal Husbandry Co. 
v. Hu,  No. 15 Civ. 10015, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471, 2017 WL 3328239 
(S.D.N.Y. August 3, 2017), discussed above, supra notes 44, 73-75, 77-78, 80-81, 
and 85 and accompanying text, disregarding location of predicate acts, focusing only 
on where the effects of the predicates were felt – the Third Circuit stated it found 
Dandong’s analysis “particularly helpful” because it was “nuanced” and had consid-
ered the “totality of circumstances,” without relying on any single circumstance.  
Humphrey, 905 F.3d at 706. 
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underlying incident occurred in China), and the fact that plaintiffs did 
not allege they had any offices, assets or other property in the U.S., the 
Third Circuit concluded plaintiffs had failed to allege a domestic in-
jury, even though they alleged injury to good will and the loss of (un-
identified) actual and prospective U.S. customers.119 
The Third Circuit expressly stated it was aware the approach it 
was taking in Humphrey had been rejected by the Seventh Circuit in 
Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp.120   It explained 
that Armada’s approach, reliant on the rule that a party experiences or 
sustains injury to its intangible property at its residence, was neither 
“helpful” nor “persuasive,” on the facts before it.121  Although Ar-
mada’s residence-based rule is frequently applied, as the Third Circuit 
observed, it noted that it has rarely been applied in the RICO context 
to injuries extending beyond U.S. borders and even less frequently to 
alleged RICO injuries to intangible property.122  Thus, although a liti-
gant’s residence or principal place of business is often a good starting 
point, as the Humphrey Court explained, it is just one factor that may 
be used to inform inquiry and, where the nature of injured property 
interest is not self-evident, the concept of “residence” is too “inflexi-
ble” to be useful.123  
Humphrey noted the residency-based rule would preclude all 
foreign plaintiffs alleging intangible injuries from recovering under 
§1964 (c) regardless of their alleged connection to the U.S, even where 
all injury-causing action took place in the U.S.124  From a policy per-
spective, reading a rigid rule of residence as the determining factor as 
to where a person is injured seems incompatible with the policies un-
derlying RICO, generally, i.e., to provide a RICO remedy for any 
[every] person injured in their business or property by RICO predicate 
crimes, as well as the Corporate Standing Doctrine, which is designed 
to protect all company owners of a business entity (against asset ex-
haustion by a single plaintiff shareholder),125 and, as well, extraterrito-
riality, itself, which is intended to help identify when a claim bears a 
 
119 Humphrey, 905 F.3d at 708. 
120 Id. (discussing Armada (Sing.) PTE, Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp., 885 F.3d 1090 
(7th Cir. 2018)). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 709. 
123 Id. 
124 Id.  
125 18 U.S.C. §1964 (c); See also infra n. 157. 
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sufficiently strong relationship to the U.S. as to justify invoking RICO 
remedies.126  
In Akishev v. Kapustin,127  discussed above, District Judge Hill-
man held that merely because plaintiffs resided in Russia and never 
physically travelled to the U.S. did not automatically “classify” their 
injuries as “foreign.”128  Domestic injury existed, it held, because the 
foreign plaintiff was defrauded by U.S.-based internet car dealers and 
“the locus delecti of the crimes was committed in the United States.”129  
The location of the fraudulent conduct was an important factor in de-
termining whether injury was “domestic,” as sales were on-line.  The 
Third Circuit, in Humphrey, noted that other courts had observed that 
the Akishev Court appeared to focus on where the plaintiffs’ injuries 
were felt, which it found was on defendant’s U.S. based website -- and, 
therefore, in the U.S. Its conclusion was partly policy based.  Finding 
that the injury was not “domestic,” the Akishev Court stated would, in 
effect “allow the United States to become a haven for internet 
fraud.”130  It held: 
Plaintiffs should be afforded the same remedies 
available to a United States citizen who purchased a car 
from defendants in the exact same manner and were de-
frauded in the exact same scheme… Plaintiffs …have 
come to the place where they were induced by fraud to 
spend their money and where those ill-gotten proceeds 
were realized and retained.131  
B. District Decisions in the Ninth Circuit -- Tatung 
Co. Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu 
In Tatung Co. Ltd. v. Shu Tze Hsu,132 plaintiffs maintained a 
business “hub” in the U.S. and extended credit and delivered goods to 
 
126 The Humphrey court noted that although courts examining extraterritoriality 
issues have rarely explicitly stated they are engaged in a multi-factor inquiry, this is, 
in fact, what they have been largely doing.  905 F.3d at 707. 
127 No. 13 Civ. 7152, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 2016, 2016 WL 5475998 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 8, 2016). See also Matyev v. Kapustin, No. 16 Civ. 530, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
58626, 2017 WL 1398648 (D.N.J. April 18, 2017) (companion case to Akishev).  
128 Akishev, 2016 WL 5475998 at *16. 
129 Id. at **20-21. 
130 Id. at *19. 
131 Id. at *20. 
132 217 F. Supp. 3d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
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a defendant in the U.S.133  Defendant defaulted on a credit obligation 
and plaintiff obtained an arbitration judgment in California.  Plaintiff 
alleged that defendants conspired to prevent collection of the judg-
ment, targeting their conduct at California, to impair plaintiff’s 
rights.134  Defendants relied almost exclusively on the analysis in the 
then recent district decision in Bascuñan for the proposition that 
whether an injury is domestic for civil RICO purposes depends exclu-
sively on where plaintiff suffered injury, not where defendant’s alleged 
conduct took place.135  Plaintiff’s RICO claim had to fail, they argued, 
because plaintiff was a foreign corporation and could not suffer a do-
mestic injury under RJR.136   
District Judge Carter disagreed and declined to follow Bascu-
ñan.137  He began by noting that in RJR, the Court expressly avoided 
defining “domestic” and “foreign” injury and that the parties in RJR 
had stipulated plaintiffs’ injuries were not domestic.138  This is why, in 
that case, he explained, it made sense for the Court to couch its analysis 
in terms of “injuries suffered outside of the United States” and “en-
tirely . . . abroad.”139  While RJR observed that RICO lacks “foreign-
oriented language,” which weighed towards finding extraterritoriality, 
it, nevertheless, explained that the absence of such language “does not 
mean that foreign plaintiffs may not sue under RICO.”140  Judge Carter 
held plaintiff could plausibly argue its U.S. business was harmed by 
defendants’ misconduct, with injury felt in the U.S., where plaintiff 
had a U.S. judgment, entitled to U.S. law protection.  Defendant’s con-
duct so clearly occurred in California, he held, that “[it] would be ab-
surd to find that such activity did not result in a domestic injury to 
Plaintiff.”141   
 
133 Id. at 1155-56. 
134 Id. at 1156. 
135 Id. at 1154. 
136 Id.  (“Defendants rely almost exclusively on Bascuñan for the proposition that 
whether an injury is domestic for the purposes of civil RICO depends exclusively on 
where the plaintiff suffered the injury, not at all on where the defendant’s alleged 
conduct took place.”). 
137 Id. at 1155.  (“…this Court declines to follow Bascuñan…[T]his Court finds 
that RJR Nabisco does not bar foreign plaintiffs who have suffered only economic 
injuries from bringing suit pursuant to civil RICO’s private right of action.”).  
138 Id. at 1154-55. 
139 Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2108, 2111). 
140 Id. at 1155 (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2110, n.12 (emphasis added)). 
141 Id. at 1156. 
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 [2020], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/11
2020 RICO EXTRATERRITORIALITY 1369 
Judge Carter further stated his concern that Bascuñan would 
amount to an immunity for U.S. companies which, acting entirely in 
the U.S., violate civil RICO at the expense of foreign corporations do-
ing business in this country.142  It cannot be the case, he stated, that 
“the mere fact that a loss is economic means that foreign corporations 
are unable to avail themselves of the protections of civil RICO, even 
in cases where all of the actions causing the injury took place in the 
United States.”143  He continued: 
It is ludicrous to think that a foreign individual 
could not sue under civil RICO for financial injuries in-
curred while they are working, traveling, or doing busi-
ness in this country as the result of an American RICO 
operation. But, this is the logical application of the Bas-
cuñan rule.144 
Judge Carter found a domestic injury existed.  Plaintiff was a 
foreign corporation doing business in the U.S., with a corporation, 
wholly owned by an American company,145 and, although foreign, 
plaintiff maintained a “hub” in the U.S.146  In the course of doing busi-
ness, Plaintiff extended credit and delivered goods to its creditor in the 
U.S. and, when plaintiff was not paid by its creditor, it pursued arbi-
tration in the U.S. under a binding arbitration agreement requiring ar-
bitration in Los Angeles.147  The arbitration demand was delivered to 
the creditor at their California address and, after three years of arbitra-
tion, Plaintiff finally received an award, which was confirmed by a 
state court in California, and which was enforceable in California.148  
Plaintiff was unable to collect on its judgment because, alleg-
edly, its creditor and many others engaged in a RICO conspiracy to 
render the creditor an “empty shell” by siphoning assets out of the 
creditor through fraudulent transfers.149  Seven of the alleged individ-
ual conspirators were American citizens, as were six entity conspira-
tors - at least one of the eventual transferees was an American corpo-
ration.150  The litigation was Plaintiff’s attempt to hold responsible 
 
142 Id. at 1155. 
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 1156. 
146 Id. at 1555. 
147 Id. at 1156. 
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
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those entities and individuals who conspired to prevent Plaintiff from 
recovering its funds. 
Quoting plaintiff’s briefing, Judge Carter held that “defendants 
specifically targeted their conduct at California” with the aim of 
“thwarting Tatung’s rights in California” and he concluded it “would 
be absurd to find that such activity did not result in a domestic injury 
to Plaintiff.”151  He further noted that his decision was consistent with 
other decisions in the Ninth Circuit that interpret RJR Nabisco’s do-
mestic injury requirement, including Uthe Tech. Corp. v. Harry Allen 
and Aetrium, Inc., which reached a different result on different facts, 
as detailed below.152  
IV. PART IV 
A. The Corporate Standing Doctrine 
Another rationale for applying a multi-factor analysis exists 
where a foreign corporation has a large number of U.S. shareholders 
who are necessarily and, thus, inevitably injured as result of injury to 
the business entity in which they are invested.  RICO standing analysis 
has traditionally deemed shareholder to be “derivative” of injury suf-
fered by the corporate entity and, hence, to be causally “remote.”  Nev-
ertheless, shareholders stand to benefit from RICO claims brought by 
 
151 Id.  
152 Tatung Co., Ltd., 217 F.Supp. at 1156-57 (discussing Uthe Tech. Corp. v. Harry 
Allen and Aetrium, Inc., No. C 95-02377 WHA, 2016 WL 4492580 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 
26, 2016)).  Judge Carter distinguished Uthe on the ground that in that case, plaintiff 
was an American corporation which owned 100% of a Singaporean corporation and 
alleged a scheme to siphon business from its wholly-owned subsidiary.  In Uthe, 
alleged fraudulent activity occurred in Singapore, perpetrated by Singaporean de-
fendants and plaintiff's only injury was the diminution in value of its stake in the 
Singaporean corporation, an injury the court characterized as “domestic.”  Uthe, 
2016 WL 4492580, at *2. However, the court found that as to injury to the Singapo-
rean corporation, its “claims . . . flowed only from a foreign conspiracy” namely 
“siphoning [that] occurred a third of the way around the globe” with no injury occur-
ring in the U.S. Id. at *3.  Uthe dismissed the RICO claim because a shareholder 
cannot bring a RICO action where the wrong alleged was a “fraud on the corpora-
tion.” Id. at *1-2.  In Tatung, the Corporate Standing Rule was not involved, some 
of the alleged conspirators were American and many of the actions constituting part 
of the RICO scheme took place in California, not, to quote the court -- a “third of the 
way around the globe from our shore.” See Uthe, 2016 WL 4492580, at *3.  Uthe is 
discussed in more detail immediately below in Part IV, addressing in more detail the 
Corporate Standing Doctrine. 
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the corporation in which they hold an ownership interest.  Although 
the shareholders lack individual standing to bring legal claims to pro-
tect their interests, damage to their ownership is compensated through 
the entity recovery.   
In the context of RICO extraterritorial analysis, damage to the 
intangible ownership rights of a substantial number of U.S. sharehold-
ers may have a far greater domestic impact than a similar intangible 
injury suffered by a foreign corporation with all foreign shareholders.    
The Corporate Standing Doctrine concentrates all of a com-
pany’s shareholders’ rights of action into the entity of which they are 
owners.153  It does so to protect shareholders, collectively, against the 
potential exhaustion of assets which might be effected if a single share-
holder were to recover on its claim and exhaust a company’s assets 
through enforcement of a damage award.154  Where the entity recovers, 
the shareholders benefit, collectively, and they will recover, pro rata, 
based on the impact that the recovery has on the value of their 
shares,155 in direct proportion to the percentage of shares that share-
holder owns in the corporation.156   
All owners are, thus, protected, proportionally and equitably, a 
point RICO commentators have observed in discussions of standing 
and direct injury in RICO litigation.157   
 
153 Courts have generally held that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring a RICO action 
for injuries which are derivative of an injury to another entity, such as the injuries a 
shareholder might suffer from financial harm inflicted upon a corporation.  See, e.g., 
Manson v. Stacescu, 11 F.3d 1127, 1131 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Since the shareholder’s 
injury, like that of the creditor, generally is derivative of the injury to the corporation, 
the shareholder’s injury is not related directly to the defendant’s injurious conduct.” 
(citing Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992))).  
154 Laurence A. Steckman and Kenneth Moltner, Recent Developments in Direct 
Injury Analysis in the Second Circuit: An examination of the Injury and Causation 
Elements of RICO Standing, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 5, 1992, at 1, col. 1, 
reprinted 15 RICO L. REP. 274, Feb. 1992. 
155 Id. at 277.  
156 Id.   
157 The Corporate Standing Doctrine implicitly recognizes that entity shareholders 
are injured by RICO misconduct by assuring they will experience a pro rata recovery 
for injury to their shares.  Although the Corporate Standing Doctrine denominates 
the entity as having exclusive standing to recover for injury to the company, this 
merely defines a mechanism to assure the shareholders, who own the business, will 
have their own rights vindicated, in an efficient matter, that does not favor any par-
ticular shareholder who might be inclined to file a suit, for his personal benefit. See 
generally Steckman and Moltner, supra n. 154, at 275-277.     
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The above described rule, which we refer to as a “Shareholder 
Standing Rule,” implicitly recognizes that where entity shareholders 
are injured as a result of corporate losses, shareholder rights must be 
protected.  This is equitably accomplished by allowing the corporation 
to recover its losses, through which the shareholder recovers propor-
tionately the loss of value of shares.  The Standing Rule thus creates a 
mechanism which assures the shareholder owners of a business will 
have their individual rights vindicated in an efficient manner that does 
not favor any particular shareholder who or which might be inclined to 
file a suit and exhaust, for personal benefit, what assets exist.158 
Courts analyzing RICO causation have recently focused on the 
directness of injury rather than on foreseeability of an injury.  In Hemi 
Group LLC v. City of New York,159 the majority rejected the view of 
dissenting Justice Breyer who would have held that foreseeability was 
a sufficient basis for proximate causation (i.e., defendant intended to 
inflict the foreseeable tax loss injuries upon plaintiff),160 by pointing 
 
158 If a shareholder could recover for injury to a corporation, the shareholders who 
were not part of the legal action would be left out of any recovery.  Conversely, when 
the corporation recovers for an injury it has suffered, the benefit to the corporation 
as a result of the recovery is shared by the shareholders in proportion to the percent-
age of shares they hold. 
159 Hemi Group LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010). 
160 Id. at 12.  In Hemi, the City of New York sued internet tobacco sellers for en-
gaging in a scheme which involved failure to file Jenkins Act reports which required 
tobacco sellers to report their customers to the appropriate state authorities.  The cig-
arette end-buyer was responsible to pay the tax.  However, only through receipt of 
the Jenkins Act reports could the State (or New York City) identify the taxpayers.  
The Hemi Defendants specifically advertised that they would not file Jenkins Reports 
and would not disclose its customer lists to government agencies.  As a result, inter-
net cigarette buyers who wanted to avoid paying high New York state cigarette taxes 
could buy their cigarettes over the internet knowing the purchases would not be re-
ported and they would not have to pay taxes on their cigarette purchases.  Because 
the State shared the Jenkins Reports with the City, it was foreseeable that the Hemi 
Defendants open flouting of the Jenkins Report requirements would result in the cig-
arette purchasers’ non-payment of state and local taxes, which would prevent the 
City of New York from identifying the internet cigarette purchasers who owed state 
taxes, preventing the City from collecting state taxes as the Hemi Defendants’ busi-
ness model involved attracting customers who wished to avoid state and local taxes 
by advertising they would not report their information to the authorities.  The Hemi 
Defendants’ refusal to file Jenkins Reports effectively prevented the City from iden-
tifying those Hemi Defendants customers who owed taxes.  Despite obvious foresee-
ability, the majority (or plurality) in Hemi held foreseeability alone insufficient to 
establish proximate cause.  Hemi further held that, notwithstanding foreseeability, 
the indirectness of the City’s injury compelled dismissal on the ground that there was 
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out that foreseeability was not mentioned in either of the opinions in 
the leading RICO opinions Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,161 or 
Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp.162  Some courts have taken 
this exchange as a formal rejection of foreseeability concepts as rele-
vant to RICO proximate causation analysis.163  However, the Hemi 
Court did not completely reject any consideration of foreseeability; ra-
ther, it held that the dissent’s reliance solely on foreseeability was in-
adequate, in itself, to establish proximate causation.164  Its focus on 
directness of injury in RICO actions,165 however, has resulted in criti-
cism,166 with some commentators strongly favoring Justice Ginsberg’s 
 
no proximate cause between the Hemi Defendants’ conduct and the City’s injury 
because New York State had a more direct injury than the City.  Notably, it did not 
determine whether the State would have had standing if it rather than the City had 
sued. Id. at 5-6, 9, 11-12, 16, 17.  
161 Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006). 
162 Holmes v. Securities Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258. 
163 DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE G. REED, CIVIL RICO  6.04, at 15 (2018) (“Some 
lower courts have taken this exchange as a formal rejection of foreseeability con-
cepts-typically considered under common-law causation theory- in determining 
proximate causation for RICO claims.”).  See also id. at n. 25.34 (citing Koch v. 
Royal Wine Merchants, Ltd., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340 (S.D. FL 2012); 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 172480, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2012) (“…the Supreme Court specif-
ically rejected an interpretation of proximate cause that would turn on foreseeabil-
ity.”).  
164 Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 12 (2010). 
165 Id. (“[T]he focus is on the directness of the relationship between the conduct 
and the harm.”).  See also Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 
(2008) (“The direct-relation requirement avoids the difficulties…”); Anza v. Ideal 
Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 460 (2006) (“The requirement of a direct causal 
connection is especially warranted….”); Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection 
Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (“[P]roximate cause” requires some direct relation be-
tween the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged).  See generally Kaiser 
Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices 
Litig.), 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013) (describing Supreme Court precedent). 
166 See, e.g., THE SUPREME COURT, 2009 TERM: LEADING CASES: III. Fed-
eral Statutes and Regulations: F. RICO Act, 124 HARV. L. REV. 390, 396-397 
(“…[w]hile the plurality and the dissent take conflicting positions with regard to how 
proximate causation should be assessed - with the plurality considering the number 
of steps between the defendant's action and the resultant harm to the plaintiff, and 
the dissent considering the foreseeability of the defendant's actions causing harm to 
the plaintiff - it is not clear that either approach convincingly leads to the conclusions 
that the plurality and dissent reach in this case.  One might quite reasonably argue 
that one standard is preferable to the other as a policy matter.  But regardless of the 
standard applied, causation is a legal concept that a court can easily manipulate in 
order to achieve a particular outcome.  A ‘directness’ standard provides definitive 
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preference for a foreseeability test,167 on either procedural,168 or other 
grounds, some suggesting Hemi actually established a new, binding 
doctrine.169  
 
legal conclusions only if there is a metric for assessing the ‘directness’ of a causal 
chain.  The plurality opinion provides the illusion of utilizing some sort of definitive 
metric when it notes the general unwillingness of courts to ‘go beyond the first step.’  
But the Court has certainly demonstrated its willingness to go more than one step in 
RICO suits.  Even if the Court were to definitively establish a maximum number of 
intervening steps in a causal chain after which it could not be said that one actor had 
proximately caused harm to another, the ultimate finding of causation would still turn 
on the way in which the causal chain was described.”).  
167 See, e.g., id. at 400 (“…Justice Ginsburg's concurrence emerges as the most 
laudable of the three opinions issued by the Court.  Refusing to engage in the exercise 
of defining proximate causation, Justice Ginsburg expressly stated her reasons for 
dismissing the City's claim: she was reluctant to allow the City - an entity that, as a 
first matter, could not constitutionally impose a tax on out-of-state sellers like Hemi 
- to recover damages for a violation of an Act in which Congress declined to include 
a private right of action.  In so doing, she provided a measure of transparency.  One 
might argue, of course, that allowing the judiciary to make policy judgments in lieu 
of strict legal analysis undermines the rule of law and has antidemocratic implica-
tions.  But while the Court might attempt to define proximate causation and the state-
city relationship in a way that provides less interpretive flexibility, such definitions 
have proven elusive for generations of jurists.  Some legal questions may always be 
indeterminate.  In such cases, courts can and should rely on policy considerations.  
When they do so, however, they need not mask their thought process, but should, as 
Justice Ginsburg did in Hemi, lay bare their reasons for holding as they do.  Such 
transparency increases the legitimacy of judicial decisions made in areas ‘not ame-
nable to bright-line rules.’”).  
168 See, e.g., G. Robert Blakely and Michael Gerardi, Eliminating Overlap, or Cre-
ating a Gap? Judicial Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 and RICO, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 435 (2014) (Discuss-
ing Hemi Group, LLC, – “In cases where no majority opinion exists, the narrowest 
rationale in support of the judgment governs.”)  See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may 
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds ….’”) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 69 n.15 
(1976) (plurality opinion)). 
169 See, e.g., id. at 447 (“[S]ome of the circuit courts of appeal have erroneously 
treated Chief Justice Robert's plurality opinion as a majority opinion that states a new 
binding doctrine.”).  See, e.g., CDX Liquidating Trust v. Venrock Assoc., 640 F.3d 
209, 214 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A common definition of [proximate cause] is that there 
must be proof of ‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious 
conduct alleged.”) (quoting Hemi Group, LLC, 559 U.S. 1, 9); John K. Cornwell, 
RICO Run Amok, 71 SMU L. REV. 1018, 1034-5, Fall 2018 (“Because Justice So-
tomayor did not participate in the case, Hemi Group provides no clear guidance on 
the role of foreseeability in civil RICO's proximate cause analysis.  Four members of 
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As a practical reality, it is extremely difficult to entirely divorce 
the concept of foreseeability from an analysis of “directness.”  Hemi 
left open the possibility that the State of New York might have a RICO 
claim because its injury was “more direct” than the City’s injury.  Nev-
ertheless, the State’s injury was not entirely direct as the Hemi Group’s 
refusal to file Jenkins Reports with the State resulted in the State being 
unable to identify taxpayers who were refusing to pay tax on their cig-
arette purchases – the most direct cause of the State’s injury, therefore, 
was actually the taxpayer’s refusal to pay taxes.  However, the Hemi 
Group’s failure to file Jenkins Reports (with the State) made the injury 
foreseeable and the injury to the State was more direct than the injury 
to the City.  But for the Hemi Group’s refusal to file the reports with 
the State, neither the State nor City would have suffered their injuries 
as they would have known the identities of the consumers who owed 
taxes on their internet purchased cigarettes.170   
Where a shareholder is injured by a RICO defendant’s acts 
taken against the corporation in which he holds shares, damage is fore-
seeable and more direct than the injury suffered by the City of New 
York in Hemi as there are no intervening causes or intervening parties.  
The RICO wrongdoer causes harm to a corporation and, necessarily, 
its shareholders.  The shareholder is usually precluded from taking di-
rect action against the alleged wrongdoer but  “…the inability of de-
rivatively injured plaintiffs in the typical direct injury cases to bring 
direct actions for derivative injuries does not preclude their own 
 
the Court unequivocally rejected it; one refused to join in that rejection; three affirm-
atively embraced it; and one has taken no official position on the issue but tends to 
side with those who favored it.  In light of this uncertain terrain, it should come as 
no surprise that lower courts have struggled to understand how best to articulate 
proximate cause requirements in this context.”). 
170 See Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. at  25 [Breyer, J. dissent-
ing] (“…[t]he majority claims that ‘directness,’ rather than foreseeability, should be 
our guide in assessing proximate cause, and that the lack of a ‘direct’ relationship in 
this case precludes a finding of proximate causation... (citation omitted).  But courts 
used this concept of directness in tort law to expand liability [for direct conse-
quences] beyond what was foreseeable, not to eliminate liability for what was fore-
seeable.  Thus, under the ‘directness’ theory of proximate causation, there is liability 
for both ‘all “direct” (or “directly traceable”) consequences and those indirect con-
sequences that are foreseeable.’  Prosser and Keeton § 42, at 273 [emphasis 
added].”). 
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derivative recoveries under RICO.”171  Injured corporation sharehold-
ers are protected under RICO and can recover for their injuries.172 
Whether deemed direct or indirect, proximate or derivative, tra-
ditionally corporate shareholders are protected under the Corporate 
Standing Doctrine.  Singular or primary reliance on where a corporate 
plaintiff resides may deprive domestic shareholders of foreign corpo-
rations of the ability to recover for RICO injuries caused by RICO mis-
conduct directed at foreign corporations despite the fact that, poten-
tially, a foreign corporation could be substantially owned by U.S.-
based shareholders injured in their business or property.  However, this 
is not to say plaintiffs alleging derivative injuries should be able to 
bring direct actions for those injuries.173    
In Uthe Tech. Corp. v. Aetrium Inc.,174 plaintiff alleged it was 
injured by defendant’s theft of its customers, harming its Singaporean 
subsidiary’s business, reducing the company’s share value.  The court 
determined that the injury was derivative in nature and, on appeal, 
plaintiff tried to change its theory to claim a direct injury based on 
 
171 See Laurence A. Steckman and Kenneth Moltner, Recent Developments in Di-
rect Injury Analysis in the Second Circuit: An examination of the Injury and Causa-
tion Elements of RICO Standing, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 5, 1992, at 1, col. 
1, reprinted 15 RICO L. REP. 274, Feb. 1992. 
172 Id.  (“…[i]n the typical types of contexts where the direct injury requirement 
has been applied, plaintiffs’ rights to recover in each case are protected.  Any recov-
ery by the corporation against the RICO wrongdoer will be distributed pro rata on a 
share basis to the corporation’s derivatively injured owners…[t]hus the inability of 
derivatively injured plaintiffs in the typical direct injury cases to bring direct actions 
for derivative injuries does not preclude their own derivative recoveries under 
RICO.”).  
173 See generally 1 CIVIL RICO supra, note 163 at § 6.04, § 5 (ii)  The Injury 
Requirement; The Derivative Injuries of Shareholders and Others (“The prohibition 
on bringing suit for derivative injuries can be traced back to early antitrust standing 
jurisprudence, and it can be considered one aspect of a direct injury requirement for 
standing, but it also has been considered a limitation imposed by proximate causation 
analysis under RICO… every circuit to address the question has borrowed for civil 
RICO claims the standing doctrine that appeared in antitrust precedent as early as 
1910, that ‘neither a creditor nor a stockholder of a corporation that was injured by a 
violation of the antitrust laws could recover treble damages.’  The prohibition … that 
‘neither a creditor nor a stockholder of a corporation that was injured by a violation 
of the antitrust laws could recover treble damages.’ … has been uniformly applied to 
RICO suits brought by shareholders… the mere diminution in the value of a corpo-
ration’s stock as a result of a defendant’s racketeering conduct will not support share-
holder standing to bring suit; instead, only the corporation, as the directly injured 
party, has standing to recover.”).  
174 Uthe Tech. Corp. v. Aetrium Inc., 739 Fed. Appx. 903 (9th Cir. 2018).  
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defendant’s “theft” of the business.  The Ninth Circuit explained de-
rivative injuries occur where all of a corporation’s stockholder are 
harmed solely because they are stockholders, e.g., where a corporation 
is injured by losing assets, the equity owners suffer injury “indirect” 
and “derivative” of the entity’s injury – the sole and sufficient cause of 
their loss is the injury to company shares, in their hands.  The Ninth 
Circuit held plaintiff had no standing to recover for the derivate inju-
ries that were basis of its pleading because the injuries inflicted were 
on a different legal entity, i.e., the corporation, through which it was 
only indirectly affected, and it was not be permitted to belatedly try to 
change its theory to allege a direct injury.175   
The plaintiff in Uthe was a U.S. corporation, which had been 
the sole shareholder of its Singapore subsidiary.  In addition to moving 
for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff had no standing 
to bring a RICO derivative action, the defendant in Uthe had filed a 
separate summary judgment motion arguing that Uthe’s alleged injury 
-- the harm caused to its subsidiary’s business and the resulting dimi-
nution of the value of the company’s shares -- was not a “domestic 
injury” within the meaning of RJR Nabisco.176  Notwithstanding de-
fendant’s summary judgment motion based on the absence of any “do-
mestic injury” (as required by RJR), the district court granted defend-
ant’s summary judgment “on the sole ground that Uthe’s alleged 
injuries were derivative and, as a result, Uthe did not have standing to 
pursue its RICO claim.”177 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit decision in Uthe was based 
solely on a review of the district court’s dismissal due to Uthe’s ina-
bility to seek recovery for a derivative injury suffered as a result of 
harm to its Singaporean subsidiary.178  By refusing to dismiss on the 
basis of the absence of a “domestic injury,” the district court implicitly 
(if not explicitly) found that injury to the plaintiff (which was the do-
mestic shareholder of a Singapore entity) did constitute a “domestic 
injury.”179  If the Singaporean subsidiary had filed a RICO action then, 
theoretically it could seek a recovery which would have benefited its 
 
175 Id. at 905. 
176 Id.    
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 907. 
179 Uthe Tech. Corp. v. Allen, No. C 95-02377, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115016, 
2016 WL 4492580 at *3 (N.D. CA, Aug. 26, 2016) (holding that “Uthe’s…domestic 
injury is not cognizable as a claim under Civil RICO” because “Uthe’s injury plainly 
derived from the injury to its former subsidiary.”). 
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shareholders (putting aside, for the purpose of this hypothetical, that 
Uthe has sold its shares).  However, in light of RJR a foreign corpora-
tion with U.S. shareholders could be barred from pursuing RICO rem-
edies because of an inability to meet the “domestic injury” require-
ment.   
The question of what factors should be considered in extrater-
ritoriality analysis to determine “domestic injury” is not co-extensive 
with the question of whether a person who suffers a derivative injury 
should have standing to sue for that injury.180  Because damage to the 
company necessarily damages its owners in their business or prop-
erty,181 RICO remedies should be available, to them, through the vehi-
cle the law makes available under the Corporate Standing Doctrine.  
The widely accepted rule barring shareholders from bringing direct ac-
tions, however, should not mean that when the company sues to protect 
its (and necessarily its shareholder’s) injuries, that the location of 
shareholder injury not be taken into account in extraterritoriality anal-
ysis under a statute that provides a remedy for any person injured by a 
statutory violation.   
To the contrary if, for example, the majority of owners are lo-
cated in the U.S., there is every reason to find their business or property 
(their ownership rights) are compromised and that compromise is felt 
where they are located, at their U.S. residences, regardless of where 
their shares, if any,182 happen to be located.  This scenario indicates 
yet another reason why using the location of the foreign plaintiff as the 
sole factor in determining whether there has been a “domestic injury” 
is problematic.183  In the context of using a multi-factor test to 
 
180 See 1 CIVIL RICO supra, note 163 at 6.04, § 1 Introduction (“[F]or the most 
part, the standing issues involved in civil RICO litigation will be answered by a de-
termination of the scope of RICO’s statutory language authorizing a suit by ‘any 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962.’”). 
181 See Steckman and Moltner, supra note 154, at 277 (“…the inability of deriva-
tively injured plaintiffs in the typical direct injury cases to bring direct actions for 
derivative injuries does not preclude their own derivative recoveries under RICO.”) 
(italics in original).  
182 Dandong, 2017 WL 3228239 at *30 (injury occurs where injured party suffers 
injury which, in the case of injury to intangible property, is the place where the in-
jured party resides). 
183 See Humphrey, 905 F.3d at 707 (“…the applicable factors depend on the plain-
tiff’s allegations; no one factor is presumptively dispositive.”  See also Dandong, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122471 at *30, note 7 (S.D.N.Y. August 3, 2017); Tatung 
Co. 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2016); Akishev, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
169787 at * 16-17 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 2016).  
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determine whether there is a “domestic injury” for purposes of RICO 
extraterritoriality analysis, granting a high degree of significance to the 
existence of domestic shareholders in a foreign corporation provides 
an elegant solution to the possibility of U.S. shareholders being barred 
from any RICO recovery through application of both the Corporate 
Standing Doctrine and a determination of RICO extraterritoriality 
which relies solely on a corporation’s residence to determine whether 
the company may properly allege a domestic injury, as it sues not only 
on behalf of its self, but necessarily on behalf of its injured sharehold-
ers.    
B. Location of Injury, Standing and RICO Domestic 
Injury — an Elegant Solution 
In cases adjudicating corporation wrongdoing, where a foreign 
plaintiff is involved, plaintiff is frequently deemed injured where he/it 
is resident and, so, injury is deemed to coincide with the foreign resi-
dence.  Outside the extraterritoriality context, the location of injury is 
not necessarily fatal to the ability to maintain a substantive claim, but 
it may be a basis of dismissal, for example, on procedural/jurisdictional 
grounds.184    
As indicated above, under the RICO statute, any (every) person 
(including legal persons) may recover for injury to their “business or 
property.”  The test of “injury to business or property” is, and has been, 
a test of RICO causation.185  Efforts to engraft the Standing Rule, i.e., 
 
184 See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (dismissing claims brought by Nigerian 
nationals under Alien Tort Statute alleging Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations 
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing violations of Nigerian law 
because “all of the relevant conduct took place outside of the United States.”;  In re 
Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 522 F.Supp. 712, 724 (D. N.J. 2007) (dismiss-
ing federal securities claims filed by Non-U.S. Purchasers because of lack of suffi-
cient conduct within the U.S. on the part of Defendants); WesternGeco LLC v. ION 
Geophysical Corp, 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018); (“[t]he focus of a statute is ‘the object[t] 
of [its] solicitude,’ which can include the conduct it ‘seeks to regulate,’ as well as the 
parties and interests it ‘seeks to protect’ or vindicate.” (brackets omitted) (quoting 
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267)).  
185 See generally Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006) 
(“When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question 
it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff's injuries.”); 
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (“…a 
plaintiff’s right to sue…required a showing that the defendant’s violation not only 
was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.”); In re 
EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practice & Antitrust Litig., 336 
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which denies individual standing to individual shareholders to protect 
them all, as a group, should not be allowed to become a shield protect-
ing a wrongdoer from RICO liability merely because a U.S. share-
holder happens to invest in a foreign corporation.  Such engrafting 
would represent an unprecedented and unwise expansion of current ex-
traterritoriality analysis.  In other words, the fact that a U.S. share-
holder cannot individually sue to recover for a foreign corporation in-
jury does not mean the shareholder has not suffered “injury to business 
or property” within the meaning of the RICO statute.186   
Where a company is victimized, shareholder injury can be fore-
seen (satisfying the foreseeability test of RICO loss causation),187 in-
jury is direct (few intervening causes),188 and that damage represented 
 
F.Supp. 3d 1256, 1320 (D. KS 2018) (“Section 1964 (c)’s causation requirement re-
quires a RICO plaintiff to allege ‘that the defendant’s violation not only was a ‘but 
for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.” (citations omitted)); 
In re Schering-Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, No. 06-CV-
5774, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58900, 2009 WL 2043604 (D.N.J. July 10, 2009) (“To 
assert a RICO claim based on mail and wire fraud, a plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the injury to plaintiff's business or property was caused ‘by reason of a violation’ of 
RICO.”); See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 (To establish causation, a plaintiff is required 
to show that the RICO violation “not only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury but was 
the proximate cause as well.”); Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 
U.S. 258, 268, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 117 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1992) (Proximate cause requires 
“some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”)  
186 See generally  Laurence A. Steckman and Robert E. Conner, Loss Causation 
Under Rule 10b-5, a Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis: When Should Representational 
Misconduct be Deemed the Cause of Legal Injury Under the Federal Securities 
Law?, LAW REPORTER, 1998 SECURITIES ARBITRATION, Vol. 1, Ch. 16, (P.L.I. 
1998), reprinted RICO Vol. 28, No. 2, at 173 (Aug. 1998), reprinted PRIVATE 
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT REPORTER, Vol. 5, No. 6, at 897 (Sept. 1998). 
187 See Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 415 F. Supp. 2d 423, 440 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Thus, an individual shareholder lacks standing to bring his or her 
claim where ‘the duty owed to the shareholder [] is . . . indistinguishable from the 
duty owed to the corporation.’  Absent an independent duty, the shareholder's per-
ceived injury is deemed to be considered the same injury as that to the corporation 
and, consequently, the shareholder maintains no separate right of action separate and 
apart from the corporation's.”) (citing Vincel v. White Motor Corp., 521 F.2d 1113, 
1121 [2d Cir. 1975, Shapolsky, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 751, and Fifty States, 396 N.Y.S.2d 
at 927) (emphasis added). 
188 See Hemi, 559 U.S. at 11 (finding no foreseeability because “the conduct di-
rectly responsible for the City’s harm was the customers’ failure to pay their taxes.  
And the conduct constituting the alleged fraud was Hemi’s failure to file Jenkins Act 
reports.  Thus, as in Anza, the conduct directly causing the harm was distinct from 
the conduct giving rise to the fraud.”).   
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the materialization of a non-market risk (effected the wrongdoer).189  
The purpose of the RICO extraterritoriality bar is to prevent claims that 
have little to do with the U.S. from filling U.S. courts,190 it is not in-
tended to bar claims that have everything to do with RICO misconduct 
perpetrated, for example, in the U.S., by U.S. citizens, and injuring, 
inter alia, other U.S. citizens whose property (their ownership inter-
ests), are compromised, based solely on the happenstance of where the 
injured foreign (corporate) person happens to be resident.  If a case is 
U.S.-focused, a RICO claim should neither be barred by RJR nor cases 
like Bascuñan.191 
Flood gate arguments are not persuasive in this context.  No 
rule says a single (or a few U.S. shareholders) can or should defeat 
extraterritoriality, in a given case.  If every shareholder of a plaintiff 
company were a U.S. citizen and the company was foreign but de-
frauded by RICO crimes injuring all the U.S. citizens in the U.S., 
through U.S. located fraudulent conduct, it would be illogical to assert 
these RICO-injured persons should be unable to obtain recovery 
through the company’s case, even if it was the most efficient means of 
 
189 Materialization of risk is a test of loss causation used primarily in securities-
fraud cases where damages arise from a materialization of a concealed risk.  See, 
e.g., Ohio Public Employees Retirement System v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corp., 830 F.3d 376, 384-385 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[a] decisive majority of circuits have 
also recognized the alternative theory of materialization of the risk whereby a plain-
tiff may allege proximate cause on the ground that negative investor inferences, 
drawn from a particular event or disclosure, caused the loss and were a foreseeable 
materialization of the risk concealed by the fraudulent statement.”) (citations and 
quotations omitted); In re Harman Int’l Inc, Sec. Litig., 791 F.3d 90, 110 (D.C. Cir. 
2015); (“[a] plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss …by alleging…the loss was 
foreseeable and caused by the materialization of the risk concealed by the fraudulent 
statement.”); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]his court’s cases…require both that the loss be foreseeable and that the loss be 
caused by the materialization of the concealed risk.”).  
190 RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 2111 (“Section 1964 (c) requires a civil RICO 
plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or property and does not 
allow recovery for foreign injuries.”). 
191 Humphrey, 905 F.3d at 709 (RICO claim must involve domestic injury, but “ 
‘[i]t cannot be the case that the mere fact that a loss is economic means that foreign 
corporations are unable to avail themselves of the protections of civil RICO, even in 
cases where all of the actions causing the injury took place in the United States.’”) 
(citing Tatung Co., Ltd., 217 F.Supp. at 1155.); But see RJR Nabisco Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
at 2114-2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Kagan, J.J.) (disagree-
ing with domestic injury requirement as it will result in dismissal of RICO claims on 
extraterritorial grounds even where a claim “has the United States written all over 
it.”). 
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recovery, merely because the company happened to be incorporated 
outside the U.S. and owned no specific tangible property in the U.S.  
In the context of a RICO extraterritoriality dismissal motion, the loca-
tion of shareholder owners of a company should be counted in the con-
sideration of whether a sufficient domestic injury exists because they 
are among the persons injured in their business or property and deriv-
ative causation is not incompatible with RICO proximate causation.192   
Assume a foreign company 1, with no U.S. shareholders, has 
one New York trading account.  Assume defendants’ mail and wire 
fraud RICO predicates outside the U.S. damage the account and plain-
tiff sues under RICO based on injury to its N.Y. account.  Because the 
property is in the U.S., even though plaintiff and all its owners are for-
eign, and all the misconduct took place outside the U.S., despite the 
lack of any substantial U.S. connection, other than an adverse effect on 
one account, the injury would be deemed domestic and RICO standing 
would exist.   
Contrast a foreign company 2, with all its shareholders in the 
U.S., claiming damage by virtue of defendants’ mail and wire fraud, 
inside the U.S., damaging the value of its shares.  This company would 
fail to satisfy extraterritoriality, for lack of domestic injury, even 
though the purpose of the extraterritoriality is to distinguish cases in 
which the injurious conduct has a substantial relationship to the U.S. 
from those that do not, an absurd result.193  Singular focus on “where” 
the injury occurs does not, in all cases, bear a substantial relationship 
to the central concern and purpose of the extraterritoriality doctrine, 





192 See Vincel v. White Motor Corp., 521 F.2d 1113, 1121 (2d Cir. 1975) (“the 
duty owed to the shareholder[] is… indistinguishable from the duty owed to the cor-
poration.”); Henneberry, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 440 (“[a]bsent an independent duty, the 
shareholder's perceived injury is deemed to be considered the same injury as that to 
the corporation…”) (emphasis supplied). 
193 Humphrey, 905 F.3d at 709 (RICO claim must involve domestic injury, but 
“‘[i]t cannot be the case that the mere fact that a loss is economic means that foreign 
corporations are unable to avail themselves of the protections of civil RICO, even in 
cases where all of the actions causing the injury took place in the United States.’” 
(quoting Tatung Co., Ltd., 217 F.Supp. at 1155)).  See also RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2114-
2115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Kagan, J.J.) (disagreeing with 
domestic injury requirement as it will result in dismissal of RICO claims on extra-
territorial grounds even where a claim “has the United States written all over it.”). 
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C. Consideration of Shareholder Residence – an 
Elegant Solution 
After Bascuñan, commentators observed potential problems 
stemming from the RICO extraterritorial analysis,194 not only with re-
spect to which types of property will be treated as tangible property 
(which, if located in the U.S. would provide a basis for extraterritori-
ality) and which types of property will be treated as intangible property 
(in which case the place of injury for RICO extraterritorial purposes 
would be determined by the residence of the plaintiff),195 but stemming 
from  Bascuñan’s observation that a U.S. shareholder is injured in its 
place of residency when the value of the shares is diminished.  As one 
commentator observes the Second Circuit -- “may have unintentionally 
given the green light for U.S.-based shareholders RICO suits regard-
less of the company whose shares the U.S. investor owns,”196  recog-
nizing that U.S. resident shareholders of the foreign corporation could 
be frozen out of any recovery even if their injury is felt within the 
U.S.,197 just because of the Standing Rule.198  
 
194 See, e.g., Nicholas M. Rose, Second Circuit Clarifies Civil Rico “Domestic In-
jury” Requirement, (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/second-cir-
cuit-clarifies-civil-rico-domestic-injury-requirement. 
195 Id. (“We anticipate that the Second Circuit’s tangible/intangible distinction will 
be difficult to apply on a principled basis…[G]oing forward, it will be difficult to 
predict which sorts of property are ‘analogous’ to tangible property such that they 
will be treated as tangible property.”). 
196 Id. (“U.S.-based shareholders of international companies should carefully con-
sider the potential for lucrative recoveries under RICO following the Second Cir-
cuit’s indication that a U.S. shareholder’s residency satisfies the domestic injury re-
quirement due to ‘the diminished value of [its] ownership interest in a company.’”). 
197 Pursuant to the Corporate Standing Doctrine, if each U.S. shareholder could 
bring a separate action for their damage as a shareholder, this would likely result in 
disproportionate recoveries and exhaustion of corporate assets.  Moreover, corpora-
tion shareholders generally lack standing to bring direct claims to recover for dam-
ages that they suffer as a result of a diminution of assets of the corporation(s) in 
which they hold shares.  See, e.g., Manson, 11 F.3d at 1130 (“Since the shareholder’s 
injury, like that of the creditor, generally is derivative of the injury to the corporation, 
the shareholder’s injury is not directly related to the defendant’s injurious conduct.”) 
(citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269). 
198 See Uthe, 739 Fed. Appx. at 906 (plaintiff alleging theft of its customers, harm-
ing its Singaporean subsidiary’s business, and thus reducing the company’s share 
value, lacked RICO standing because its alleged injuries were derivative and a plain-
tiff may not use the civil RICO statute to recover for derivative injuries.); Warren v. 
Manufacturers Nat’l Bank, 759 F.2d 542, 544 (6th Cir. 1985) (“diminution in value 
of the corporate assets is insufficient direct harm to give the shareholder standing to 
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Concerns have been raised by commentators regarding the vi-
ability and workability of the tests proposed in Bascuñan including 
with respect to injured shareholders: 
[A]lthough the Second Circuit rejected the dis-
trict court’s residency based rule, the Second Circuit’s 
test nevertheless relied on choice of law principles-just 
as the District Court had-in determining how to identify 
the location of the injury.  While the District Court 
looked to New York’s borrowing statute, the Second 
Circuit relied on the “Second Restatement’s presump-
tive choice-of-law rule regarding ‘Injuries to Tangible 
Things.’”  As we observed in our analysis of the District 
Court’s ruling, choice of law rules and principles vary 
across jurisdictions.  Continued reliance on choice of 
law rules and principles to determine how to identify 
the location of a RICO injury may, therefore, result in 
different “location of the injury” tests across the differ-
ent jurisdictions, incentivizing forum shopping to find 
the jurisdiction that has the most favorable rules for de-
termining the location of the specific injury in question. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Sec-
ond Circuit limited the application of its “location of the 
property” test to tangible property (or property that is 
analogous to tangible property): bearer shares located 
in a New York safety deposit box and finds held in a 
New York bank account, which the Court treated as tan-
gible property for the purposes of the case.  That test 
does not appear to apply to other sorts of property in-
terests, such as ownership of shares in a company.  In-
deed, the Court reaffirmed its holding from a different 
case-Atlantic Holdings - that a shareholder’s injury (in 
the form of “the diminished value of ownership interest 
in a company”) occurs in “the shareholder’s place of 
residence.”  In other words, while the district court’s 
“place of residence test” does not apply to tangible (or 
 
sue in his own right.”); Manson, 11 F.3d at 1130 (Since the shareholder’s injury, like 
that of the creditor, generally is derivative of the injury to the corporation, the share-
holder’s injury is not directly related to the defendant’s injurious conduct.) (citing 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).  
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analogously tangible) property, it does apply to certain 
other types of property. (Emphasis added).199 
There is wide variation in how courts determine whether there 
is a “domestic injury” for purposes of RICO extraterritorial analysis.200  
If RICO is to be interpreted to assure any person who suffers a RICO-
predicate caused injury to their business or property, the multi-factor 
Third Circuit approach makes good sense.201  Humphrey’s multi-factor 
analysis identifies several non-exhaustive factors to be considered in 
determining whether a domestic injury exists, factors which, in appli-
cation, will certainly vary from case-to-case.202  Where a foreign cor-
poration asserts claims under RICO, the existence of domestic share-
holders of such a corporation injured by the alleged RICO predicate 
crimes should be considered in determining whether there is a domes-
tic injury for purposes of RICO extraterritoriality.   
Commentators have echoed concerns Justice Ginsburg raised 
in her RJR dissent, noting not only contradictions in Justice Alito’s 
majority opinion, but the possibility that civil RICO cases which, in 
Justice Ginsburg’s words “ha[ve] the United States written all over” 
them will not be able to be litigated in U.S. courts, contrary to RICO’s 
language that provides a remedy of any (every) person injured.203  That 
 
199 Rose, supra note 194. 
200 Humphrey, 905 F.3d at 700 (“…since the plaintiffs in RJR Nabisco had waived 
their claims for domestic injuries, the Court did not need to explain how courts should 
determine whether an alleged injury has been suffered domestically or abroad.... . .  
those courts that have considered whether an alleged injury was suffered in the 
United States have applied varying standards.  Thus, there is no consensus on what 
specific factors must be considered when deciding whether an injury is domestic or 
foreign.”).  See also Rose, supra note 194 (Bascuñan “appears to raise more ques-
tions than it answers.”). 
201 Humphrey, 905 F.3d at 707 (“Whether an alleged injury to an intangible interest 
was suffered domestically is a particularly fact-sensitive question requiring consid-
eration of multiple factors.  These include, but are not limited to, where the injury 
itself arose; the location of the plaintiff's residence or principal place of business; 
where any alleged services were provided; where the plaintiff received or expected 
to receive the benefits associated with providing such services; where any relevant 
business agreements were entered into and the laws binding such agreements; and 
the location of the activities giving rise to the underlying dispute.”). 
202 Id.  
203 See, e.g., Jake Elijah Struebling, Federal Criminal Law and International Cor-
ruption: An Appraisal of the FIFA Prosecution, 21 NEW CRIM. L. R. 1, 19-20 (dis-
cussing the Justice Ginsburg dissent, joined by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan, 
criticizing the majority’s imposition of a domestic injury requirement, as follows: 
“‘One cannot extract such a limitation from the text of § 1964(c), which affords a 
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risk, however, can be mitigated through consideration of a multiple 
factor extraterritoriality analysis including, where appropriate, the lo-
cation of an injured company’s U.S. shareholders.204  Notably, RICO 
does not distinguish between injuries suffered through an entity, from 
those not so derived, so long as proximate cause can be established, as 
it can for derivative injurie, under RICO causation tests. 
Consideration of the residence of shareholders, i.e., the situs of 
their injury to business or property, is supported by a number of con-
siderations.  First, if RICO cannot be accessed to remedy  shareholder 
injuries for lack of domestic injury, a derivative suit would be ineffec-
tive because the derivative suit would be to compel the company to sue 
under RICO – yet if the company already sued and was barred by ex-
traterritoriality issues, it could not be compelled to do more than what 
it already did, namely sue – and in the absence of a “totality of the 
circumstances” analysis, such a suit could be barred solely due to the 
corporate residence of the plaintiff.  Second, even if it would be possi-
ble for an individual shareholder to sue in a private action, essentially 
because the corporation could not bring the action, that would poten-
tially allow the shareholder to exhaust defendant assets, which is pre-
cisely what the Corporate Standing Doctrine is meant to eliminate, as 
 
right of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962.”  Section 1962, at least sections (b) and (c), all agree, en-
compasses foreign injuries.  How can § 1964(c) exclude them when, by its express 
terms, § 1964(c) is triggered by “a violation of section 1962?” [citing Justice Gins-
burg’s dissent in RJR].  Justice Ginsburg's question is a good one.  The Court does 
not satisfactorily explain how a foreign violation of one of RICO's predicates is not 
cognizable under section 1964(c)--especially where the predicate offense has extra-
territorial application and is actionable by reference to RICO's substantive provi-
sions.  Indeed, the Court denies its own logic that RICO's extraterritoriality should 
be coextensive with that of the underlying predicate offenses.  Even as a practical 
matter, a domestic-injury requirement ‘makes little sense’ where ‘[a]ll defendants are 
U.S. corporations, head-quartered in the United States, charged with a pattern of 
racketeering activity directed and managed from the United States, involving con-
duct occurring in the United States.’  The Court effectively immunizes U.S. enter-
prises operating in foreign nations from civil liability under RICO -- a result that 
seems ‘hardly solicitous of international comity or respectful of foreign interests.’”).   
204 See generally City of Almaty v. Ablyazov, 226 F.Supp. 272, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) (citing RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2215-16 [Ginsburg, J. dissenting] and noting 
that the Justice Ginsburg opined that the “[Supreme] Court’s domestic-injury rule 
means that ‘U.S. defendants commercially engaged here and abroad would be an-
swerable civilly to U.S. victims of their criminal activities, but foreign parties simi-
larly injured would have no RICO remedy’”).     
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well as portend potential double recovery, if the class subsequently 
sued, or inconsistent outcomes.   
In other words, the policies underlying the broad coverage of 
RICO remedies (to provide a remedy for any (every) person injured in 
their business or property – which include U.S. resident shareholders), 
extraterritoriality analysis (to eliminate those cases with little connec-
tion to the U.S., but not others), and the Corporate Standing Doctrine 
(to protect all shareholders, pro rata, by concentrating the right of re-
covery for the injuries of all owners into the entity), are all benefitted 
by consideration of shareholder residence as a factor in a multi-factor 
analysis of domestic injury.  Smart policy strongly suggests courts 
should consider the location of shareholders whose ownership interests 
have been injured by RICO misconduct in a totality of circumstances 
analysis of all factors relevant to the application of the RICO statute. 
Support for this theory recently received additional support in  
Aviles v. S&P Glob., Inc.,205  in which  District Judge Oetken, citing 
dicta in Bascuñán v. Elsacafor the proposition that when the injury 
alleged involves diminished value of ownership interest in a company, 
the locational nexus of the injury for extraterritorial purposes was the 
shareholder’s place of residence.206  He noted the Second Circuit’sre-
liance on Atlantica Holdings which applied a residence-based rule for 
cases in which the harm alleged was diminished value of shares. While 
finding that rule inapposite on the facts of Bascuñán,  he nevertheless, 
held that where a shareholder’s “ownership interest in a company” suf-
fers a drop in value, the “clear locational nexus” is “the shareholder’s 
place of residence.207  
V. CONCLUSION 
No sound argument supports the view that courts should effec-
tively over-rule a legislature that enacted RICO remedies for any per-
son injured in their business or property by engrafting a standing rule 
that would disable U.S. shareholders from maintaining a statutory ac-
tion to seek a remedy Congress plainly wanted them to have.  Cer-
tainly, this should not be achieved by applying a corporate law stand-
ing rule designed to assure all injured shareholders are protected by an 
efficient, fair mechanism, allowing them to recover, pro rata, 
 
205 380 F. Supp. 3d 221, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
206 Id.  
207 Id.  
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consistent with to their equity interests, for injury to their business or 
property.  There is no basis for any court to hold, as an unprecedented 
add-on to extraterritoriality analysis, a rule that might block a substan-
tial number of U.S. shareholders and the company, whose shares were 
injured in the U.S., from recovering under RICO just because the entity 
in which they were invested is incorporated in a place other than the 
U.S. 
The Second Circuit has explained: “The principal  justification 
for the domestic injury requirement, according to RJR Nabisco, is the 
need to avoid ‘international friction,’” which might be caused by al-
lowing foreign plaintiffs without U.S. domestic injuries from access-
ing RICO’s remedial scheme rather than limiting their efforts to seek 
remedies under their own foreign laws.208  Allowing foreign entities to 
demonstrate the existence of a “domestic injury” sufficient to confer 
RICO standing by proving the residence of their owners violates nei-
ther the above-stated principal policy nor the justification for a remedy 
intended to provide relief for all persons injured in their business or 
property.209 
 
208 Bascuñan v. Elsacan, 874 F.3d 806, 821 (2d Cir. 2017). 
209 Several cases since this article’s initial publication have addressed extraterrito-
riality issues.  See, e.g., Doe v. Tapang, No. 18-cv-07721-NC, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 131901 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2019) (U.S., plaintiffs failed to overcome pre-
sumption against RICO extraterritoriality where they could not overcome deficiency 
by pleading additional facts); Bascuñan v. Elsaca, 927 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2019) (Bas-
cuñan II) (remand of the Bascuñan  case in which a second amended complaint al-
leged defendants stole money from New York bank accounts that were part of an 
Estate, domestic injury existed; modification of District Court decision on remand 
did not at the Second Circuit’s analysis in Bascuñan I -- modification in Bascuñan II 
was not based on a different analysis regarding how to determin domestic injury but, 
rather, on new facts interposed in an amended pleading); Roe v. Howard, 917 F.3d 
229 (4th Cir. 2019)(where former housekeeper sued American working in Yemen 
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) alleging sexual abuse, TVPA's 
remedy provision applied because TVPA more clearly targets foreign conduct than 
does RICO, as demonstrated by its international scope and Congress's repeated ex-
pansions of extraterritorial reach, discussing RJR); Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 1386 (2018) (court properly held foreign nationals who alleged they or their fam-
ily members were injured by terrorist attacks could not bring claims under the Alien 
Tort Statute against a Jordanian bank allegedly used to transfer funds to terrorist 
groups -- following Kiobel, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the 
Alien Tort Statute claims and even where claims touch and concern U.S. territory, 
they must do so with sufficient force to displace presumption against extraterritorial 
application); Martin Hilti Family v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 386 F. Supp. 3d 319 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (RICO claim arising from a New York art gallery’s alleged sale of 
forged works was dismissed for failure to demonstrate “domestic injury” to the trust 
46





-- the Trust was injured in Liechtenstein where the funds constituting the purchase 
price for the subject forged work of art was transferred from the Trust’s Liechtenstein 
bank to the Gallery’s New York Bank Account -- notwithstanding funds were trans-
ferred to a bank account in New York, Judge Gardephe strictly applied Bascuñán’s 
rule that "domestic injury" analysis turns on the location of the plaintiff's property 
when it was harmed, not on the location where the defendant's misconduct took place 
– accordingly, he held the “…injury occurred where it relinquished control over its 
property. Because the Trust relinquished control over its money in Liechtenstein — 
when it authorized a transfer of funds from its Liechtenstein bank account to 
Knoedler's New York account — the Trust's injury was suffered in Liechtenstein.”  
Martin Hilti Family v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 386 F. Supp. 3d 319, 347-48 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019).  This interpretation leaves no room for any multi-factor test nor for 
any consideration as to where the underlying conduct comprising the RICO violation 
occurred, but would not necessarily impact the question of whether shareholder res-
idence should be factored into a determination of whether a foreign corporation with 
a substantial number of shares held by U.S. residents may have suffered a “domestic 
injury” by virtue of the residence of its shareholders); Catano v. Capuano, No. 18-
20223-Civ-TORRES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146443 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2019) 
(plaintiff properly alleged domestic injury to real property in the state of Florida, 
citing, Bascuñan, 874 F.3d at 822 ("[T]reating injuries involving tangible property 
located within the jurisdiction of the United States as 'domestic,' accords with" the 
principles underlying the federal RICO statute).  
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